The Turtle House

Thursday, 13 October 2016

Thoughts and Prayers go to King Rama IX, the King of Kings, and to his family, wishing all wellbeing in this time.

Thoughts and Prayers go to King Rama IX, the King of Kings, and to his family, wishing all wellbeing in this time.

Bhumibol Adulyadej (Thai: ภูมิพลอดุลยเดช; rtgs: Phumiphon Adunyadet; pronounced [pʰūː.mí.pʰōn ʔà.dūn.já.dèːt] ( listen); see full title below; born 5 December 1927) is the King of Thailand. He is also known as Rama IX, as he is the ninth monarch of the Chakri Dynasty. Having reigned since 9 June 1946, he is the world's longest-serving current head of state[1] and the longest-reigning monarch in Thai history, serving for 70 years, 126 days.[2]

In 1957, the military overthrew the government with allegations of lèse majesté,[3]:136–137[4] which is an offense against the dignity of the monarch, punishable under Thai law,[5] starting a new and long-lasting relationship between the monarch and military in governmental matters.[6] Although Bhumibol did invite public criticism in a 2005 speech,[7] the lèse majesté laws have not been revoked by the Thai parliament.

Forbes estimated Bhumibol's fortune—including property and investments managed by the Crown Property Bureau (CPB), a unique body that is neither private nor government-owned—to be US$30 billion in 2010, and he was the head of the magazine's list of the "world's richest royals" from 2008 to 2013.[8][9][10] In May 2014, Bhumibol's wealth was once again listed as US$30 billion.[11] Officially the assets managed by the CPB are owned by the crown as an institution, not Bhumibol Adulyadej as an individual.[12]

Since 2006, Bhumibol has suffered declining health and has spent extended periods at Siriraj Hospital. Bhumibol is generally highly revered by the people in Thailand,[13][14] but his heir Vajiralongkorn does not share the popularity of his father, leading to concerns that the Thai monarchy will lose prestige and influence after Bhumibol's death.[15][16]

As NK proliferates, so do bad ideas

It may not be attractive, but it is the reality we will be facing for the next few years.

Oct 10,2016

With Pyongyang’s accelerated testing of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, policy pundits and politicians have pulled out a menu of failed policy proposals from the past in an effort to finally “solve” the North Korean nuclear program. Those interested in a sober and realistic approach to this next phase of the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis can start by checking the following off their list.

1. Now Is the Time for A Grand Bargain with Pyongyang!

Two senior scholars at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC trotted out this idea again on September 30 in the Washington Post for anybody who has not been paying attention to the diplomatic record with North Korea over the past two decades. “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result,” they stressed, implying that the United States has tried only pressure and not diplomacy with the North.

In fact, North Korea has violated every nuclear agreement with the outside world from the North-South agreement in 1992, to the Agreed Framework in 1995, to the Six Party agreement in 2005 and the Leap Day agreement in February 2012 — plus another dozen commitments in between. The Kim Jong-un regime is telling anyone and everyone that the North is not interested at all in denuclearization. They could be interested in talks about recognizing them as a nuclear weapons state, but that would be entirely counterproductive.

2. The Only Way to Stop the North’s Nuclear Program Is a Pre-emptive Strike!

This is a minority view one hears in the United States, but it is growing. However, one never hears this argument from any expert living in Seoul or Tokyo or anywhere else within range of North Korean missiles and artillery. The logic of the argument is that diplomacy has failed and that North Korea must be stopped before it develops the capability target the United States itself. All efforts should be made to curb the North’s missile and nuclear programs, to be sure. Moreover, as Victor Cha pointed out in his last column, a pre-emptive strike cannot be entirely ruled out since the United States will not know what warheads might be on future North Korean ICBM tests.

However, the call for a pre-emptive strike as the solution to the North Korean nuclear program underestimates the danger of retaliatory war by the North and overestimates the impact of North Korean ICBMs. Yes, North Korean ICBMs would present a whole new level of threat, but the United States lived under such a threat from the Soviet Union during the Cold War and never retreated from its commitment to nuclear umbrellas over NATO and Asian allies. North Korean nuclear armed ICBMs would be a serious threat, but not a great enough risk to merit military strikes in any scenario short of imminent attack.

3. Cut a deal with China to Stop North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Ambitions!

The North Korean nuclear program is so challenging that senior officials and politicians are frequently tempted to believe that we only need to bribe China into helping us pressure the North. Some argue that the United States should abandon Taiwan or human rights or Japan in order to entice Beijing to do more to pressure North Korea. The recent Council on Foreign Relations Task Force proposed that the United States promise not to station U.S. troops in North Korea after unification as a way to induce China’s cooperation. Park Geun-hye’s China policy was premised on the idea that warmer relations with Beijing will pressurize North Korea, until President Xi Jinping refused to take her calls in the wake of North Korea’s nuclear test.

The reality is that none of these “enticements” has or would fundamentally alter China’s basic view that the collapse of North Korea is contrary to Chinese strategic interests and that pressure only increases the danger of instability. Indeed, a number of CFR Task Force members dissented on the proposal to promise China there would be no U.S. forces north of the DMZ, recognizing it would have no effect in China and only make the United States look desperate. President Park, meanwhile, has decided that wooing China has done little good and now she is prepared to demonstrate to Beijing the consequences of Chinese complacency on North Korea by deploying THAAD. The reality is that China is paralyzed on North Korea and moves when it is obvious that the U.S., South Korea and Japan are prepared to take things into their own hands.

4. Force Regime Change!

Hope for regime change has been the refuge of frustrated North Korea policy makers for decades. The Clinton administration helped to sell the Agreed Framework in the U.S. Congress two decades ago by quietly suggesting the light water reactors would never have to be built because the North Korean regime would collapse first. Some hardliners in the Bush administration tolerated the Six Party Talks because they assumed the regime would not last long enough to receive all the benefits included in the September 2005 accord. Recognizing that North Korea may only now give up nuclear weapons when the regime changes, some pundits are pushing for an active policy of regime change. Yet the same fundamental problem remains: what tools does the United States have to bring down the regime if China continues propping it up?

The reality is that we are now in a world where no grand bargains, no bold strikes, no clever diplomatic framework will make the North Korean nuclear weapons program suddenly end. The United States and Korea will have to take steps that reinforce deterrence, interdict dangerous shipments of technologies and nuclear-related technologies to the North, keep pressure on China to enforce sanctions, reduce the risk of North Korean actions, and impose costs that over time might lead to different choices in Pyongyang. It will be hard, detailed and sometimes dangerous work. It may not be attractive to politicians and policy pundits, but it is the reality we will be facing for the next few years.

*The author is senior vice president for Asia and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and associate professor at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.

Michael Green

Flying colors: A dispatch from North Korea’s first-ever air show The Wonsan Air Show attracted locals as well as tourists, showcasing the DPRK's air power

Flying colors: A dispatch from North Korea’s first-ever air show

The Wonsan Air Show attracted locals as well as tourists, showcasing the DPRK's air power

NK News

October 10th, 2016

Over the weekend of September 24-25th, North Korea’s very first air show was held in the eastern port city of Wonsan.

The festival was the creation of Mr. David Thompson-Rowlands, manager and owner of the British tour company Juche Travel Services. An aviation enthusiast himself, Thompson-Rowlands’ company has long focused on providing special interest tours to North Korea.

After having arranged a couple of aviation tours since 2011, the biggest break came in 2015 when the company brought in 150 participants for the 60th anniversary of the North Korean national carrier Air Koryo. Shortly after this event, the Wonsan Air Festival was launched as the next big thing for 2016.

Sunset over Kalma Airport | Photo credit: NK News

Those familiar with negotiations with North Korea will know it was quite an achievement to arrange a festival of this magnitude. It also clearly shows that the North Korean state had a particular interest in the event and it was not just for earning foreign currency.

The festival was very much the creation of Mr. David Thompson-Rowlands, manager and owner the British tour company Juche Travel Services

In a time when North Korea faces even tougher sanctions, including limitations on jet fuel, the air festival could be seen as an act of defiance to show that the country is managing well, despite being under intense pressure from the outside world. This message would also resonate well with the country’s ongoing “200-day speed battle”.

The choice of Wonsan for the venue is also interesting. Initially the plan was to have the festival at the newly rebuilt airport in Pyongyang, but for practical and security reasons this wasn’t possible.

North Korean pilots the “Flowers of the Sky” | Credit: NK News

During an aviation tour in 2015, the schedule was suddenly changed, allowing the group to visit the new airport situated on the Kalma peninsula outside Wonsan. At that time, the airport was not yet officially opened, but from a publicity point of view, it was a smart move to bring in 150 aviation enthusiasts who would appreciate it and spread the word.

It was clear that the airport had been built with international travel in mind, possibly bringing in Chinese tourists and, if the political climate were to change, even South Koreans. The airplane parking spots at the terminal were even prepared to accommodate a Boeing 747 jet – some suggested that it was perhaps in preparation for a visit by a future U.S. President.

Beer for sale at Kalma Airport | Photo credit: NK News

The general impression was that Kalma airport had been designed by someone with a passion for aviation, not only in a practical sense but also with a playful twist. Pleasant public areas with restaurants and cafés featuring airplane interiors added to this feeling. It is rare for major events to be staged outside of Pyongyang, but in this case the unused Kalma airport proved to be the ideal location – it can certainly also be seen within the wider context of promoting the new Wonsan-Mt. Kumgang International Tourist Zone.

MD 500 | Photo credit: NK News

During the two days of the air festival we witnessed several aviation displays, ranging from model aircraft to the entire classical Air Koryo fleet and, of course, fighters and helicopters from the Korean People’s Army Air Force. The last was probably the most unique.

Koreans waiting to go home | Photo credit: NK News

Usually all things even vaguely military are off bounds for photography in North Korea, so this open display in front of hundreds of cameras was quite remarkable. At first the rule was to observe at a safe distance of 5 meters from the military aircraft, but this broke down very soon, especially after the arrival of the two female fighter pilots.

MIG 21 | Photo credit: NK News

These two “Flowers of the Sky”, as they are called by Kim Jong Un, were greeted as heroes by the Korean audience as they made low flybys in their aging MiG-21 fighters. The open participation of the KPA Air Force was yet another indication of how much importance the North Korean state had given to the air festival.

Tupolev 134B3 and Wonsan city | Photo credit: NK News

If the first day was mostly about displays, then the second was all about participation. Some brave individuals even took part in the “friendship skydive” and seemed to enjoy it very much. For the less adventurous among us, there were several pleasure flights with the Air Koryo passenger planes (all newly repainted) and KPA helicopters.

The female pilots attract a crowd | Photo credit: NK News

As is often the case in North Korea, the schedule was tight, so some people even missed their “pleasure flight connections,” but for most it seemed to have gone well. Depending on the type of aircraft, the prices per flight ranged between €100 and €250 .

Usually all things even vaguely military are off bounds for photography in North Korea, so this open display in front of hundreds of cameras with huge lenses was quite remarkable

One interesting addition was the chance to fly with the two small aircraft, Alpi P-400 and Piper Matrix. Sadly the Alpi P-400 flight was canceled (the only cancellation) and the Piper Matrix, more interestingly, was swapped for the PAC-750 XSTOL light aircraft. The pleasure flights took us north along the coast towards the city of Hamhung and back again.

Disembarking Ilyushin 18D | Photo credit: NK News

While there were approximately 200 foreign visitors divided into smaller groups with experienced tour leaders, the Korean audience reached upwards of 20,000. It is likely that people had been “drafted” from the Wonsan area to take part in the event.

This huge crowd was divided into groups with individual designations and leaders. Everyone arrived, by foot, early in the morning and stayed at the airfield until sunset.

Su 25 cockpit | Photo credit: NK News

One very surprising and a quite extraordinary aspect was that the foreign visitors could mingle freely with the Korean crowd, without being accompanied or followed by any obvious minders.

There was a kind of carnival atmosphere, fuelled by several beer tents and snack stalls. As a national beer festival was held concurrently, this gave the participants the chance to sample a wide range of Korean beer at very affordable prices (1 USD per 50 cl).

Aviation enthusiasts on the move | Photo credit: NK News

Real interaction between Koreans and foreigners was limited, naturally, mostly due to the language barrier, but the attitude was friendly and an overwhelming feeling of curiosity. Walking around in the crowd, closely followed by hundreds of eyes, was quite remarkable.

…a quite extraordinary aspect was that the foreign visitors could mingle freely with the Korean crowd, without being accompanied or followed by any obvious minders

Apart from the aviation activities, other events were also arranged, for example a “raffle” in benefit of the North Korean Red Cross: very timely with regard to the recent flooding disaster in the North Hamgyong province. A classical Korean music performance was staged on Saturday night and on Sunday a mass dance took place at the central Haean square in Wonsan.

The crowd watches the show | Photo credit: NK News

As is customary, the foreigners were encouraged to join the thousands of students dancing in the square. At regular intervals, the students shouted the words “IL SHIM TANGYEOL,” meaning “Single-Hearted Unity” – the mass dance gave us quite a literal representation of that ideological concept.

Instead of staying in a hotel in Wonsan, we were all based at the newly renovated Songdowon International Children’s Camp. Staying in pink colored rooms with furniture and facilities designed for young children was quite striking and added to the whole festival experience.

The P-750, later revealed to be of New Zealand origin | Photo credit: NK News

The first ever Wonsan International Friendship Air Festival (as was its full name) was clearly a great success, both for the Korean and foreign organizers. Many people expressed their willingness to return, and Mr. Thompson-Rowlands of Juche Travel Services has already begun planning how to improve and expand the festival for next year.

It is always prudent to take one year at a time when dealing with a country such as North Korea, but I wouldn’t be at all surprised if there’s another, and possibly bigger, Wonsan Air Festival in 2017.

Edited by: Oliver Hotham

The author wished to remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of working in-country

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

NK News

NK News is a North Korea specialist news and information resource head-quartered in Delaware, U.S.A.

How to help North Koreans without helping the regime

The omnipresence of the regime presents a moral challenge for those who want to aid the people

John Lee

October 11th, 2016

When Typhoon Lionrock swept through North Korea from late August to early September, it destroyed tens of thousands of buildings and left thousands homeless and even more destitute than they were before. The destruction was so severe that the KCNA declared that it the ‘biggest cataclysm’ since [1945’s] Liberation (though one would think that that dubious honor ought to belong to the Korean War).

The United Nations said that it needed close to US$30 million to repair the damages. Considering the fact that winter will soon be arriving, where temperatures look set to fall well below freezing, the actual price tag may end up being much more. For those unfortunate souls who have lost everything they had, saying that they need urgent help is an understatement.

Although the North Korean regime has not made any formal requests for international aid, there are reports that Kim Jong Un has ordered his closest henchmen to do exactly that, albeit quietly and behind closed doors. However, as desperate as the North Koreans may be for help, any kind of help, it is highly unlikely that Kim Jong Un will come knocking on Seoul’s door with his hat in hand.

He has spent so much time threatening and vilifying South Korea and President Park Geun-hye that asking South Korea for help would not only be humiliating, but it could also significantly erode his authority in Pyongyang.

Although the North Korean regime has not made any formal requests for international aid, there are reports that Kim Jong Un has ordered his closest henchmen to do exactly that

POLITICAL CREDIBILITY

Kim Jong Un has very little besides his image as a strong leader. If he loses that as well, there is no telling what kinds of ideas those in his inner circle may get.

But even if he did the unthinkable and asked South Korea for help, there is very little desire for the South Korean government to offer it. The South Korean government’s stance is perfectly understandable.

During the Sunshine years, while the South Korean government rented “peace” by forking over hundreds of millions of dollars to North Korea, it is plausible that a portion of that money was used to develop North Korea’s nuclear weapons program – the very same weapons that Kim Jong Un is using to threaten South Korea’s very existence.

Help is urgently needed for North Korea’s rural population as winter sets in | Photo by EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

And even if aid were distributed and monitored by the UN, there is no guarantee that the North Korean military wouldn’t seize the assets and sell them at inflated prices in the black market, thus depriving those most in need of help that was originally intended for them.

THE IMPACT OF SONGUN

Compounding the issue is the fact that Kim Jong Un could have easily been able to help his long-suffering subjects if only he had reallocated a small portion of his military’s budget to clothing, feeding or housing his people.

Earlier in July, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense estimated that Kim Jong Un spent at least US$97 million firing a total of 31 ballistic missiles over the past five years. He has fired even more rockets and missiles since then, and that figure does not include the cost of testing nuclear weapons.

Compounding the issue is the fact that Kim Jong Un could have easily been able to help his long-suffering subjects if only he had reallocated a small portion of his military’s budget

The fact that the suffering endured by ordinary North Koreans is further exacerbated by Kim Jong Un’s other policies, from restrictions on cross-border trade and failure to carry out agricultural reforms, has convinced the South Korean government that Kim Jong Un is either an incompetent fool or a monster. Or perhaps both.

NO EASY ANSWERS

Aside from the moral argument, which can be argued until the cows come home, the political argument, which is much stronger, favors the South Korean government’s decision not to offer aid even if asked.

The undeniable fact is that in North Korea, the regime is practically omnipresent. It can easily control, funnel, and siphon almost all money and assets that go into the country. In fact, even those brought in by NGOs can easily be hijacked if they require the regime’s permission to operate in that country.

It’s impossible to know how much aid money might end up in the regime’s coffers | Photo by Roman Harak

But the tragic reality is that if nothing is done, tens of thousands of North Koreans will likely die of wholly preventable causes, and it’s quite clear that Kim Jong Un doesn’t care how many of his people die. Like father, like son, like grandfather.

Ordinary North Koreans are in dire need of help, but this help cannot aid the regime, and no one whose conscience is worth a damn could or should look the other way.

There are some compelling alternatives. Joshua Stanton’s blog, One Free Korea, speaks forcefully and convincingly of the need for separative engagement.

What this essentially comes down to is pursuing (at least initially) clandestine operations to aid the North Korean people while circumnavigating the regime in Pyongyang.

Tactics include giving the North Korean people a means to freely communicate with the outside world and helping them to create a virtual banking network that would not be affected by Pyongyang’s diktats.

Unfortunately, separative engagement as spelled out by Joshua Stanton assumes a relative lack of urgency. Yes, information and communication that has been unmolested by North Korean censors are a vital part of eroding Pyongyang’s near monopolistic hold on “truth” and authority.

Ordinary North Koreans are in dire need of help, but this help cannot aid the North Korean regime

And yes, a virtual banking network would go a long way to help the North Korean people to drag themselves out of poverty: much like the way the M-Pesa has helped to turn Kenya into a leading pioneer in virtual currency and trade years before it caught on in the developed world. All of those things will, over time, help to create a shadow government that will undermine the regime.

TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE

But none of this matters to the tens of thousands of recently made homeless people if they do not survive the coming winter, which will arrive in a matter of weeks. When time is of the essence, the best way for people to help is by donating cash.

Typically, when a country or a city is hit by a natural disaster, the most effective way for people to offer aid is by donating cash to international relief agencies such as the Red Cross. These agencies are on the ground and they know best what it is that the people need. The same applies to North Korea.

It is imperative for individuals, businesses, churches, and civic groups – should they decide to help – to send cash donations to these types of apolitical agencies as typified by the Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (KNCCK).

Although many have argued that the South Korean government ought to seize the moral high ground and provide direct assistance, seizing the moral high ground is not a good enough reason to aid the enemy. Seizing the moral high ground comes at a cost that the South Korean government can ill afford. The task ought to be delegated to individuals and the South Korean government should stay out of their way instead of offering criticisms for doing something that it cannot do.

When time is of the essence, the best way for people to help is by donating cash

Recently, President Park Geun-hye gave a speech urging North Koreans to defect to the South so that they may enjoy the “universal values of freedom, democracy, human rights and welfare.” The president’s words will ring hollow if the South Korean government actively attempts to block individuals who enjoy these universal values from trying to save the lives of ordinary North Koreans who yearn for them themselves.

Cash is urgently needed to help those most vulnerable | Photo by Roman Harak

In the meantime, the South Korean government needs to look into, and help to create, clandestine networks that are necessary to successfully pursuing a policy of separative engagement. Eroding the North Korean government’s authority and creating a shadow government and a shadow economy will take a long time and a lot of effort. It will require the help of individual North Korean black marketers, defector groups, anti-Pyongyang regime revolutionaries, and spies. Massive aid from the South Korean and United States governments would go a long way in kickstarting this.

That way, should disasters, natural or otherwise, befall the North Korean people again, there will be no need for the type of urgency that we have on our hands today.

Edited by: Oliver Hotham

Featured Image: North Korean Children. by (stephan) on 2008-06-11 16:28:42