Wednesday, 9 December 2015

Analysis DPRK North Korea stability via NK News

November: N. Korean regime shows leadership stability, emphasizes fishing

November: N. Korean regime shows leadership stability, emphasizes fishing
Kim moving away from purges as regime stabilizes, prioritizes economic activity for “people’s well-being
December 7th, 2015

The month of November 2015 saw a continuation of the North Korean leadership’s & 
+ recent emphasis on domestic economy, including a potential change in economic policies concerning domestic fish production. The increased prioritization of fishing and pressure on fisherman may have led to recent incidences of “ghost” fishing boats turning up in Japan.
November also saw the reappearance of Han Kwang Sang, the temporary absence of Hwang Pyong So, and continued absence of Choe Ryong Hae, as well as the death of retired KPA marshal Ri Ul Sol. Though many often stipulate that the absence of North Korean elites from public view is indicative of an individual’s purge and subsequent execution, the reappearance of several prominent North Korean elites in the months have suggested a possible reduction in Kim Jong Un’s purge tactics and “reign of terror” leaning instead toward a reeducation strategy.
KIM’S ACTIVITY IN NOVEMBER
Kim made a total of 12 public appearances in November. Kim began the month attending to military and political affairs, appearing at an anti-aircraft missile firing drill of the Korean People’s Army Air and Anti-Air Force and a meeting of military education officers. He followed these events with attendance at the funeral of Ri Ul Sol, a retired KPA marshal who had served as commander of the Guard Command and a member of the National Defense Commission. In the latter part of November, Kim focused on economic affairs, which comprised six of his 12 appearances. Kim visited two fisheries and one fish-breeding ground, two factories, and rode on a trial operation of a new subway train.
Date (state media)EventSectorProvinceCounty / City
11/3/2015Kim Jong Un Watches Firing Drill of Anti-Aircraft Rockets of KPA Anti-Air UnitsMUnknown
11/5/2015Meeting of Military Education Officers of KPA Held in Presence of Kim Jong UnMPyongyangPyongyang
11/7/2015Kim Jong Un Has Photo Session with Participants in 7th Meeting of Military Education Officers of KPAM/PUnknown
11/9/2015Kim Jong Un Visits Bier of Ri Ul SolP/MPyongyangPyongyang
11/12/2015Solemn Funeral of Late Ri Ul Sol HeldP/MPyongyangPyongyang
11/14/2015Kim Jong Un Visits Pyongyang Children’s Foodstuff FactoryEPyongyangPyongyang
11/18/2015Kim Jong Un Goes Round Movable Net Fish-breeding GroundEPyongyangPyongyang
11/20/2015Trial Operation of Subway Train Conducted with Kim Jong Un on BoardEPyongyangPyongyang
11/23/2015Kim Jong Un Visits August 25 Fishery StationEKangwon
11/24/2015Kim Jong Un Enjoys Servicepersons’ Art PerformanceA/MUnknown
11/25/2015Kim Jong Un Visits Fishery Station No. 15 of KPAE/MUnknown
11/27/2015Kim Jong Un Inspects Wonsan Shoes FactoryEKangwonWonsan
PURGES AND PROBLEMATIC OBSERVATION
… while North Korean officials are in North Korea … we only see the activity which the North Korean government chooses to publish
Observing and analyzing North Korean leadership activity can be difficult because of limited information and knowledge. The vast majority of publicly available information on the current activity of North Korean leadership figures comes from Pyongyang’s own state-run media. Essentially, this means that while North Korean officials are in North Korea (which is most of the time) we only see the activity which the North Korean government chooses to publish. There is no independent press in North Korea to report on public events, conferences, and other appearances by the government and party officials. So, we only know where and when an official appeared if the state media chooses to photograph and/or mention that appearance. The North Korean government and ruling Workers’ Party of Korea also apparently feel no obligation to inform the public (let alone foreign observers) of the whereabouts or current status of senior officials when they are not otherwise appearing in public.
The distinction between “absence” and “absence from public view” is significant because not all North Korean officials who disappear from state media are necessarily inactive in government and politics or are away from the capital. The lack of observable presence can sometimes simply mean a person is not attending events covered by state media or that the person’s presence is not being reported or photographed by state media.
Kim Jong Un and Choe Ryong Hae (right of Kim) in October | Photo: KCNA
Kim Jong Un and Choe Ryong Hae (right of Kim) in October | Photo: KCNA
What all of this means is that sometimes we do not see a North Korean official and have little to no verifiable information regarding his or her whereabouts or the reason for the absence from public view. Given the reputation of the North Korean regime for being authoritarian and its history of purging officials by execution or otherwise unceremoniously removing them from the system, it is no wonder that observers are often quick to question the fate of any North Korean official who goes unseen for very long and that these unexplained absences frequently result in rumors of purges. The required length of an absence before it is suspicious is, of course, dependent on the given North Korean official and his or her normal frequency and nature of public appearances.
… observers and analysts should be conservative in interpreting absences as indicative of purges
But observers and analysts should be conservative in interpreting absences as indicative of purges. Although a purge means a disappearance, the reserve is not necessarily true. There are numerous reasons – some known and some unknown – for why a North Korean government or party official may be out of sight for weeks or even months at a time. As with governments and political parties in other nations, North Korean officials may sometimes work on projects which occupy much of their time and prevent them from attending public events or accompanying the leader on trips. Also, as human beings, they take vacations, can require medical treatment, can have family emergencies, etc. They may also be reassigned to posts which require or allow less attendance at public events or may even retire altogether. Of course, North Korea does occasionally punish senior officials, but even in these cases the person is not always executed or even permanently removed from the regime. In the past, numerous North Korean officials have disappeared from public view for months or even years, only to reappear and return to work, sometimes at positions of similar rank to that which they held when seen last.
ABSENCES, REAPPEARANCES AND RUMORS
In November and early December there have been at least three noteworthy cases of senior officials disappearing, reappearing, or both. Choe Ryong Hae, WPK Secretary for Workers’ Organization and chairman of the State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission, last appeared in state mediaon October 22 and was unseen for the entire month of November, including his conspicuous absence at Ri Ul Sol’s funeral. According to South Korean media and government sources, Choe is undergoing reeducation as punishment for problems with the power plant under construction near Mount Paektu. Given Choe’s history of disappearing only to reappear later, it is very likely he will once again return.
Han Kwang Sang (second from left) with Kim Jong Un at Wonsan Shoes Factory in January | Photo: KCNA
Han Kwang Sang (second from left) with Kim Jong Un at Wonsan Shoes Factory in January | Photo: KCNA
Conversely, Han Kwang Sang reappeared on at the funeral of Ri Ul Sol after an eight-month absence from public view, having been last seen on March 3. Han, who was previously (and may still be) director of the WPK Finance & Accounting Department, was reported as having been executed along with Hyon Yong Chol due to shortcomings regarding Pyongyang’s financial and foreign currency-earning operations. While it is certainly possible that Han was punished somehow for some failure in his duties, the report of his execution is clearly shown to have been rumor.
The third example is that of Hwang Pyong So. Hwang is director of the KPA General Political Bureau and one of the officials who most frequently appears with Kim Jong Un. In fact, Hwang himself rarely makes an appearance without Kim. Hwang was absent from public view for 22 days from November 11 throughDecember 3. Though this is not an exceptionally long absence, it was seen as unusual for Hwang. According to data from the NK News Leadership Tracker, in the past year (December 2014 through November 2015) Hwang has appeared at least 94 times, second only to Kim Jong Un’s 161 appearances and more than double that of the third most frequently appearing official, Jo Yong Won (at 39 appearances). But unlike most such absences, in this case few if any sources speculated that Hwang had been executed. Instead, South Korean media reported that Hwang was in China receiving medical treatment during this time.
Kim Jong Un and Hwang Pyong So (to right of Kim) at the funeral of Marshal Ri Ul Sol | Photo: KCNA
Kim Jong Un and Hwang Pyong So (to right of Kim) at the funeral of Marshal Ri Ul Sol | Photo: KCNA
Some of these examples, along with others, show that recently several officials were apparently punished without execution and then allowed to return. This serves as evidence of a probable shiftwithin North Korea. But the cases of Choe Ryong Hae and Hwang Pyong So in particular were notable in a different manner. In both of these most recent absences, media outside North Korea speculated that the missing official was not executed, but either undergoing reeducation (in the case of Choe) or receiving medical treatment abroad (in the case of Hwang). Previously it was common to talk about Kim’s regime as a “reign of terror” or “reign of fear” and typical of observers to assume missing elites had been executed. This change may indicate that the external perception of the North Korean regime under Kim Jong Un is gradually changing as well and that perhaps his rule is being viewed as more solidified and stable.
NEW POLICIES, BIG HAULS AND GHOST SHIPS
Kim Jong Un’s continued emphasis on economic policy may also be an indication of the perceived development of regime stability. As the North Korean leadership can spend establishing regime political security, they may look to new policies to represent the regime’s legitimacy not just externally but also domestically. One such strategy may be to demonstrate careful consideration for the “comfort of the people,” expressing concern for the people’s well-being, housing, and food. Recent North Korean leadership attention on fishing production could serve as an example of such a policy shift.
Of the six economic-related appearances Kim Jong Un made this month, three specifically focused on fish production. From mid to late November, Kim visited three fish producing facilities: two fisheries and one fish-breeding ground. When coupled with last month’s visit to the Pyongyang Catfish Farm, North Korea’s Supreme Leader has visited a total of four fish production locations in less than a month. Additionally, recent Rodong Sinmun publications have announced a new Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea’s production policy highlighting “big fish hauls.” Described as a historic revolutionary movement of “big fish hauls,” the policy calls for a “radical turn in the development of the fishing industry.”
Kim Jong Un at Fishery Station No. 15 of the KPA | Photo: KCNA
Kim Jong Un at Fishery Station No. 15 of the KPA | Photo: KCNA
Kim was reported to have stated that the new grounds would serve to make ‘the (North Korean) people’s life happy and bountiful’
Kim Jong Un himself referenced the “big fish hauls” policy, when he thanked the August 25 Fishery Station workers for their hard work “devotedly implementing the Party’s policy,” calling the “conspicuous fish scenery” the newest “fairyland in the era of Songun.” In the same manner, Kim later applauded workers at Pyongyang’s Moveable Net Fish-Breeding Ground and Fishery Station No. 15 alike for “translating into reality the Party’s intention to turn the DPRK into a world famous fish-breeding nation.” As previously mentioned, Kim’s leadership activities have seemed to demonstrate a recent emphasis onthe people’s quality of life in North Korea. The “big fish hauls” policy may be a continuation of these trends. Referring to the Pyongyang movable fish-breeding grounds, Kim was reported to have stated that the new grounds would serve to make “the (North Korean) people’s life happy and bountiful.” This recent focus by North Korean leadership on fish production, though hard to know for certain, could suggest a growing focus by the regime on demonstrating its ability to work for the good of the people.
However, despite a potential emphasis on the good of the people, the sudden push by the North Korean elite to increase fishing production could be placing everyday North Korean fishermen’s lives in danger as they risk scouting further off the coastline, attempting to bring in bigger hauls. Over the last two months alone, thirteen ‘ghost ships,’ counting over 20 dead bodies, have been reported found in the East Sea, the body of water between the Korean Peninsula and Japan (also known as the Sea of Japan). Several researchers suspect these ill-fated ships to be North Korean fishing vessels.
FULL ELITE BREAKDOWN FOR NOVEMBER
NamePosition#%
Kim Jong UnSupreme Leader12100%
Jo Yong WonVice Department Director of the WPK Central Committee650%
Han Kwang SangDirector, WPK Finance & Accounting Department542%
Hwang Pyong SoDirector, KPA General Political Bureau; Vice Chairman, NDC; First Deputy Director, WPK Organization and Guidance Depatment542%
Ri Yong GilChief of the KPA General Staff542%
O Su YongSecretary of the WPK Central Committee433%
Pak Yong SikMinister of the People’s Armed Forces433%
Kim Yang GonDirector, United Front Department325%
Jo Nam JinUnknown217%
Pak Pong JuPremier of the Cabinet217%
So Hong ChanColonel General in the KPA217%
Choe Pu IlMinister of People’s Security; Commander, Korean People’s Internal Security Forces18%
Choe Yong HoCommander, KPA Air and Anti-Air Force; Colonel General, KPA18%
Jo Yon JunFirst Deputy Director, WPK Organization & Guidance Department18%
Kim Ki NamSecretary and Director, WPK Propaganda & Agitation Department18%
Kim Won HongMinister of State Security18%
Kim Yong NamPresident of the Presidium of the SPA18%
Kwak Pom GiDirector, WPK Finance and Planning Department18%
O Kum CholVice Chief of the KPA General Staff18%
Ri Pyong CholFirst Deputy Department Director, WPK Central Committee18%
Ro Tu CholVice-Premier of the Cabinet and Chairman of the State Planning Commission18%
Ryom Chol SongDeputy Director, KPA General Political Bureau18%
Son Chol JuPolitical Commissar, KPA Air and Anti-Air Force; Colonel General, KPA18%
Yun Tong HyonVice Minister of the People’s Armed Forces18%
Note: Numbers represent only appearances with Kim Jong Un and with the name listed by state media. Elites may make other unmentioned appearances and/or appearances without Kim Jong Un, which are not reflected in this table, though may be covered by the analysis. See the NK Leadership Tracker Methodology page for more information.
Featured image: Kim Jong Un at movable net fish-breeding ground, KCNA

NK: Intelligence from NK News: Unreported exercise conducted in October combined submarines, hovercraft and modern VSV-type craft

North Korean naval exercise simulates amphibious assault, naval battles
North Korean naval exercise simulates amphibious assault, naval battles
Unreported exercise conducted in October combined submarines, hovercraft and modern VSV-type craft
December 7th, 2015


North Korean military conducted naval drills near the city of Nampo, imagery from Google Earth has revealed. The exercise, which took place on October 5, featured more than 80 watercraft and included a range of different Korean People’s Army Navy (KPAN) elements including fast attack craft, submarines and air-cushioned landing craft. Although the exact specifics of the drill such as objectives and compositions of different groups are hard to determine with the limited footage available (especially given the fact that it is unknown what phase the exercise was in at the time the photo was made), the naval craft present and their locations seem to indicate the aim was to pit two parties against each other in a hovercraft invasion of a coastal city.* Alternatively, it is possible the entire force cooperated in a mission against an entirely simulated foe, which has been the case in televised North Korean naval drills of the past.
North Korea’s vast military hovercraft force, in fact the largest in the world, is roughly divided amongst five global bases (two on the East coast and three on the West coast), the latest of which was constructed in early 2011 at a distance of just some 30 kilometers from South Korea’s Baengyeong Island. Air-cushioned landing craft are sure to play an important part in the North’s attack plans should war erupt on the Korean Peninsula, and at least 20 were thought to have been deployed to the newly built bases during the escalation of tensions in August this year. Of the two major indigenously developed types currently in use with the Korean People’s Army (KPA), 10 of each contributed to the exercise, with the smaller single-propeller “Kong Bang III” hovercraft leading the invasion ahead of the twin-propeller Kong Bang IIs, which measure around 20 meters in length. At the time the satellite image was taken this force was at a distance of roughly six kilometers from the main harbor area of Nampo and the ships and submarines assembled in front of it, where an additional Kong Bang III hovercraft was also moored, possibly as a reserve.
Oct_2015_naval_exercise_3
So Bang II and So Bang III-class air-cushion landing craft.
Curiously, a large formation of small watercraft believed to be jet skis can also be observed heading toward the rest of the participating craft. Whether these unorthodox vessels, arranged in three rough groups of 10, 10 and 12, are meant to approach larger naval ships and disable them is unclear, although this would definitely be an interesting asymmetric method of warfare for the North to explore. Alternatively, the jet skis could be employed to quickly infiltrate South Korean shorelines with North Korean Special Forces, although operational range and the craft’s limitations would impede its effective use in this role, possibly necessitating the use of a “mothership” which can carry the jet skis internally to the battle area.
Oct_2015_naval_exercise_2
Jet skis in formation
Among the forces assembled in front of the harbor itself were five submarines belonging to two different classes. The largest, of which just one of the four present on the West coast participated, was a Type 033 Romeo-class diesel-electric submarine which measures 77 meters in length, a copied vessel delivered by China but originally developed by the Soviet Union in the late 1950s. The other four submarines are all of the DPRK’s indigenously developed Sang-O I-class, a 34-meter-long craft that is slowly being supplanted by its lengthier successor, the Sang-O II. The role of these submarines in the exercise is uncertain, as they are mostly of use against larger naval craft such as the ROKS Cheonan which is believed to have been sunk by a torpedo fired by a Sang-O-class submarine on the March 26, 2010, killing 46 seamen. However, multiple variants exist including a confirmed infiltration type, one of which was captured in 1996. No naval craft above 43 meters in length (aside from the Type 033 Romeoclass submarine) appeared to take part in the drill, so it might be possible that, as was witnessed during reported exercises in the pastwhere islands were repeatedly torpedoed, the submarines’ targets may have been simulated entirely.
Oct_2015_naval_exercise_6
Romeo-class and Sang-O-class submarines (click image for full view)
Smaller supporting naval vessels, usually measuring around 25 meters, were also present in a large variety of types. Nine of these craft carried torpedoes, comprising four of the older Kusong/P4-class torpedo boats (the latter referring to their original designation and the former to that of the North Korean copy) equipped with two 450mm torpedoes, and five Sinhung-class torpedo boats outfitted with two 533mm torpedoes. More signifying of North Korea’s relatively unorthodox naval strategies are five Chaho-class craft equipped with 122mm multiple rocket launchers and another five Chongjin-class craft armed with 85mm or 100mm gun turrets, possibly of the same type as was mounted on a patrol boat that scored an immediate hit at the start of the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong on June 29, 2002. Finally, five Nampo class gunboats equipped with either two twin-barreled 14.5mm turrets or their modern 14.5mm rotary cannon replacements provided light firepower, and, considering their capabilities as landing craft, may have reinforced the attacking force.
Oct_2015_naval_exercise_5
Supporting vessels of various classes (click image for full view)
Five larger fast attack craft (FAC) in the form of three Soviet-legacy Osa I-class ships and two of their lengthened North Korean copies designated Soju-class by the U.S. Department of Defense formed the heart of what was presumably the defending force, carrying four anti-ship missiles derived from the 1960s P-15 Termit each, as well as two AK-230 twin-barreled 30mm close-in weapon systems (CIWS) guided by a Drum Tilt radar. Although antique by modern standards, large numbers of these FACs combined with their older Komar-class predecessor also still in use with the KPAN might temporarily overwhelm South Korean defenses and score some hits, especially if they are equipped with advanced variants of the P-15 Termit.
Oct_2015_naval_exercise_1
Possible defending forces in exercise (click image for full view)
The sole larger ships taking part in the drill were a single Chodo-class gunboat at 43 meters length, and a 34 meters long very slender vessel (VSV), which quite likely was the most modern component of the exercise. The first of these two combines the 85/100mm gun turret also seen on the Chongjin-class with two 37mm turrets on the rear and a ZPU-4 anti-aircraft mount, although it is not unlikely its armament has been slightly upgraded since it was last seen in video footage. The second craft is one that has seen the light of day only since 2014, and uses a very peculiar design to reach very high speeds and a large degree of stealthiness. This type of vessel is based around a very long and thin cylindrical hull to allow it to pierce waves rather than go over them, which makes for a much smoother ride, due to which higher speeds can be reached without stressing materials, equipment and personnel overly much. Although this design certainly isn’t unprecedented, North Korea is the first to produce it in a strictly military role, equipping ships in this class with a range of different weaponry, the specific types of which are unfortunately hard to identify on the example featured in this exercise. Nonetheless, development of this new class of warships is advancing at a swift pace and it is not implausible they will at one point present the South Korean navy with an unexpected challenge, be it during all-out war or smaller scale confrontations such as the ones of the previous two decades.
Oct_2015_naval_exercise_4
VSV and Chodo-class gunboat with tug nearby
Ultimately, possibly the most notable aspect of the drill wasn’t in the participating naval craft, the simulated objectives or the location where it took place, but in the fact that it was not televised or even reported. Where most known exercises are widely publicized and described by North Korean state media in an attempt to instill an image of combat readiness and ongoing modernization into foreign navies and, more importantly, the international public, it would appear the goal this time was solely to improve the skills of crew involved and test out novel tactics and weapons designs. The timing of this event is also no coincidence: At less than one and a half month from August’s volatile confrontation with the South its significance is obvious. In the end, it portrays a much more convincing image of a nation still trying to keep its navy up to date with that of its nemesis than any amount of state propaganda could, and shows the DPRK might have been more serious about the possibility of war than some have speculated.
Note: Nampho, where the exercise took place, actually lies a few kilometers upstream of the Taedong river.
Featured image: Drill of KPA Large Combined Units 572 and 630, November 2014, Korean Central News Agency
All images within text: Google Earth

Rumors of bombing attempt on Kim Jong Un spread in N.Korea

Rumors of bombing attempt on Kim Jong Un spread in N.Korea
Rumors of bombing attempt on Kim Jong Un spread in N.Korea
S.Korean explosives expert casts doubt, saying episode a rumor or a setup to win leader's favor
December 4th, 2015
However, a former demolitions instructor from the South Korean Special Forces told NK News that there is strong chance that the news is “just another North Korea rumor.”
An anonymous source told RFA that a hidden stack of explosives was found inside the Kalma Airport on October 6.
“Kim Jong Un’s visit to Kalma airport was cancelled immediately, as explosives were found a day before his visit.”
Kalma Airport, also known as Wonsan International Airport, has been the site of a major construction and renovation project over the past two years, NK News director of intelligence John Grisafi has written.
The airport was completed and revealed to the public in late September.
The source further claimed that North Korea’s State Security Department (SSD) found out about the hidden explosives, which Kim Jong Un’s Supreme Guard Command had failed to find during a previous search for threats.
“The explosives were planted inside the roof of the airport’s information desk,” the source told RFA.
“The explosive found at the desk was a box of TNT which North Koreans use to blast through mines. A box can hold about 100 explosives and each (explosive) would weigh around 200g.”
Jeong Jin-man, formerly of the South Korean Special Forces cast doubt on the rumor, at least as it was told to the RFA. For one thing, TNT is not used in the way the RFA’s article described, he said.
“First, TNT is unsuitable for blasting through mines or tunnels, unlike how the source explained,” said Jeong.
“The detonation velocity of explosives used to blast an underground tunnel is around 5,700-6,900 m/sec, and the velocity of those for blasting mines are around 4,500 m/sec, while those for open pit blasting have velocity of 3,300-5,900 m/sec.
“So the explosives used for industrial purposes have a limited detonation velocity of 3,000 to 6,900 m/sec, while TNT has a detonation velocity of 7,000 m/sec.”
Jeong explained that TNT is unnecessarily powerful for industrial use, and can emit toxic gas if detonated inside an enclosed area.
“So no one would use TNT to blast open a tunnel,” he said.
Jeong explained that, assuming that TNT was actually found by North Korean authorities, then there is a possibility that the whole incident was set up by one of the North Korean bureaus to win Kim Jong Un’s favor.
“As the RFA’s article explained, if North Korea’s SSD had found out the explosives which Kim Jong Un’s Supreme Guard Command had failed to locate, than the Supreme Guard Command might have been involved in the assassination attempt.”
“But, also, it might have been an SSD setup to win Kim Jong Un’s favor by setting up the TNT and pretending that they found it after the Supreme Guard Command had already swept the site.”
Featured Image: nikles5 (Pixabay)

U.S.-Iran deal could lead to more Iranian oil in N. Korea

U.S.-Iran deal could lead to more Iranian oil in N. Korea
U.S.-Iran deal could lead to more Iranian oil in N. Korea
Easing Iranian oil sanctions could see more exports or re-exports from China: Congressional report
December 7th, 2015
The document covers the likely consequences to Iran’s foreign policy in the wake of 
“According to some observers, a portion of China’s purchases of oil from Iran and other suppliers is re-exported to North Korea,” the article reads.
“As Iran’s oil imports increase after international sanctions are removed in conjunction with the JCPOA, it is likely that additional quantities of Iranian oil might reach North Korea, either via China or through direct purchasing by North Korea.”
The Congressional report does not give further details on the re-exports, thought the NK News ship tracker does show frequent North Korean tanker trips to a number of oil terminals in China.
Despite a long running of absence of crude oil in China’s reported trade figures with the DPRK, all signs point to a relative abundance of oil in the country, which has seen a marked increase in the number of cars on its roads.
The new demand, coupled with the DPRK’s lack of domestic oil and gas production and refinery capacity, could make it a likely destination for Iranian crude or oil products. Nor would the shipments be without precedent, during the 1980s Iran paid for North Korean missile cooperation with oil supplies.
“North Korea is one of the few countries with which Iran has formal military-to-military relations, and the two countries have cooperated on a wide range of military and WMD-related ventures, particularly the development of ballistic missile technology,” the Congressional report adds.
Iran also borrowed a page from the DPRK’s playbook during the sanctions era, changing the names and flags of its oil tankers in an attempt to circumvent sanctions.
The Middle Eastern country has some of the world’s largest super tankers, though reflagged many of them to different countries, in an attempt to keep oil flowing out of the country.  According to an articlefrom the Financial Times in 2012, over the course of three months Iran changed the flags and names of over half its very large crude oil tankers.
Although the DPRK’s tankers are at the opposite end of the scale and can carry only small amounts of oil products, NK News investigations have found that North Korea uses similar tactics to move oil from Russian terminals to Nampho on the country’s west coast.
Using flags from other countries, North Korean oil tankers can sail very close to South Korea, a route not available to DPRK flagged ships due to the May 24 sanctions, which prevent North Korean vessels from using the South’s ports and waterways.
Featured Image: Oil Pump Jack by Paul Lowry on 2008-08-13 18:25:13

Syria, Iran among N. Korea’s “resilient” customers

Syria, Iran among N. Korea’s “resilient” customers – Berger
Syria, Iran among N. Korea’s “resilient” customers – Berger
New book highlights areas of ongoing cooperation despite sanctions regimes
December 8th, 2015
North Korea has continued trafficking arms and expertise to numerous countries after the 2006 impositions of sanctions, according to a new book by Andrea Berger at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) entitled “Target Markets: North Korea’s Military Customers in the Sanctions Era”.
The 160 page document highlights how the DPRK’s potential customers can be divided into three different categories, the most of “resilient” of which are unlikely to be dissuaded by sanctions regimes alone.
“Syria, Iran, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burma and Cuba have been steadfast, continuing to contract out to Pyongyang for arms and related materiel and services in spite of taboos and legal restrictions against doing so,” the book reads.
North Korea leverages long standing relationships with many of these countries to engage in sanctions breaking behaviour. In doing so it has likely transferred weapons systems, their designs, provided training and maintenance services and even personnel to its more resilient customers.
Syria is likely one of North Korea’s most long standing collaborators, with numerous recent interactions including help with Damascus’ chemical weapons programs, shipments of chemical protection suits, gas masks as well as missile and conventional weapon parts.
Military cooperation with Damascus could be ongoing since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. The report cites the director of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, who claims a small number of North Korean officers are currently providing support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces in the country.
It might be difficult for sanctions regimes alone to pry apart these long standing relationships, the book notes, as participants are fully aware of the measures in place to prevent trade in sanctioned items.
“Resilient customers by their nature are not as sensitive to the normative and legal pressures created by the sanctions regime. In most cases, concerns vis-a-vis resilient clients also extend far beyond the North Korea military issue,” Berger told NK News.
“As a result, it is highly unlikely that any outreach by governments or the UN on the North Korea matter alone will dissuade those actors from shopping in Pyongyang,” she continued, adding that fully cutting ties between the DPRK and a resilient client country would require wider ranging political or security changes.
The DPRK has also cultivated different markets and groups of buyers, shifting its primary business away from ballistic technology to smaller arms and other weapons systems as demand changed over time.
According to the paper, some countries or non-state groups would likely prefer to buy from other sources, given current sanctions regimes and political pressures, but found that previous military aid or purchases have made them reliant on the DPRK’s catalogue.
One last group also exists which includes countries like Eritrea and the Republic of Congo, whose limited budgets mean they need to extend the functionality of existing supplies as long as possible.
“These clients seem to have been largely motivated by the need to keep certain types of ageing weapons systems or production technology in service, and North Korean willingness to provide that assistance economically,” the report adds.
TECHONLOGICAL PROGRESS
While current sanctions against the DPRK might not dissuade their long standing customers, the report also notes that they do serve to cut North Korea off from cutting edge military technologies.
This could limit North Korea’s R&D departments, forcing them to upgrade existing systems or reverse engineer what can be sourced from abroad.  According to the paper, the constraints could cause the DPRK to fall ever further behind the curve, reducing their number of existing and potential customers over time.
“The trend is already visible in markets such as Ethiopia, which is phasing out the T-54/55 tanks that North Korea previously assisted with, in favour of newer but still second-hand T-72 tanks from countries such as Ukraine.” Berger added.
“Within the next decade or two many more doors will likely close for North Korea, as its prospective clients will find it enormously difficult, if not impossible, to keep mid-Cold War era weapons systems in service.”
The report concludes that without further access to new technologies, Pyongyang may find itself ever increasingly marginalised in the global defense market.
Featured Image: Bashar al-Assad propaganda by watchsmart on 2007-09-25 21:19:37