The Turtle House

Saturday 1 October 2016

Pyongyang architecture: Transforming design in N. Korea’s capital

Singapore-based architect talks bringing diversity to a city more famous for concrete blocks

Chad O'Carroll

September 29th, 2016

Despite a reputation for Soviet-era design, overt political propaganda and gray, imposing skylines, North Korean approaches to architectural design have been changing with increasing pace in recent years.

Once a city dominated by uniform Eastern European-style super-blocks, a look at the ever-changing skyline of Pyongyang shows architects are being given increased freedom to design creatively. The result: a more individualistic and street-based approach to design, with buildings in the North Korean capital increasingly colorful, curved, but still overwhelmingly concrete.

Observing and now contributing towards the evolution of North Korean architectural design is award-winning Singaporean architect, Calvin Chua, who, for the past two years, has been directing and managing the Architectural Association’s (AA) Visiting School in Pyongyang.

The Visiting School, managed in collaboration with Choson Exchange – an NGO specializing in in-country DPRK capacity building – brings foreign architects and designers to participate in ten-day exchange programs within the North Korean capital. The goal is to foster new ideas among local architects and urban planners while also offering scope for on-the-ground research and understanding of local approaches to those participating from overseas.

But what, exactly, attracts architects to North Korea? How and why is design changing there? And are lessons being learned from the past?

Architect Calvin Chua | Picture: Calvin Chua

NK News: Is there anything notable about the architecture in North Korea that readers might not be aware of?

Calvin Chua: I think the most notable aspect of North Korean architecture for first-time visitors is the monumental buildings coated with a pastel colored paint and planned according to major visual axes.

But I guess what’s interesting about North Korean architecture and urban planning is that often buildings are designed in a very literal way.

For example, we were recently brought to see the latest development at the Central Zoo, a reptile enclosure designed by one of the local co-tutors. Inside it has an amazing double-curved roof that, in my opinion, is very well resolved using steel frames (very unusual in North Korea because all buildings are built with concrete rather than steel). On the exterior, however, the roof that you see from the interior is actually a shell of a turtle or a tortoise.

So on the exterior it looks really literal: that it’s an amphibious or reptile enclosure. But from the interior you get to appreciate a piece of architecture that is common in the rest of the world.

I guess this project reveals tension in developing a contemporary architectural language within their local context – how they negotiate the difference between something that is abstract versus something that is literal.

Reptile enclosure at Pyongyang Zoo | Picture: C. Chua

On the urban development side, I think what’s interesting is that in the early years, the development of Pyongyang was based on the urban block, a super block measuring 200 meters by 200 meters, similar to how Eastern European and ex-Soviet States were planned. But at some point, from the 70s and 80s onwards, you start to see developments sprouting up based on the design of streets.

So Tongil Street, Kwongbok Street, together with the new special projects are taking place at the scale of the street. The reason being – I think that visually – is because the street is able to create a more dynamic environment through the perspectival views.

Another related change I recently observed is that some of the new streets are designed as a collection of individual towers. For example, Mirae Street is really like a mini-Manhattan, where each building has different characteristics from its neighboring one. This is quite different from the past, where the buildings were well-coordinated along a street.

Inside the enclosure | Picture: C. Chua

NK News: Do North Korea’s architects take a mainly domestic ‘Juche’ approach to design or is there a clear outside influence from certain regions or countries?

I think just from observing Pyongyang, it appears that North Korea architecture and urbanism has evolved over the years.

Starting off in the ’50s and ’60s there was a lot of influence from the Soviet Union and its other satellite states, and therefore some of the buildings at that point in time were prefabricated. Now, however, most of the buildings are cast in situ, partly because there is no longer such technical assistance and also because the local builders are more familiar with in-situ concrete casting. So to some extent, you can see that the level of external influence or reference does affect the method of construction.

And in terms of the exterior form of building, I think it has gone through several iterations; from a neo-classical building style in the ’50s that evolved to the modernist style in the ’60s and ’70s and the neo-Korean/Juche-style, which was basically Juche architecture with Korean characteristics, in the ‘80s.

Today, I think it’s really a mishmash of influence, where a lot of the style is referenced from what is being developed overseas and domestically in North Korea. I think that while they try to be more inventive but they are also restricted by the construction methods and also the resources available. For example, if they would like to have a more geometrically complex design, there is a limitation in terms of how much they are able to curve the building.

NK News: Who are North Korea’s famous architects?

I don’t think it’s possible to identify a key architect in North Korea because the entire system basically supports a collective architectural body and a collective architectural identity. So even though we know who were the key individuals that worked on certain projects, they are always represented as an entire collective body.

Visitors participating in the AA Visiting School, Pyongyang | Picture: C. Chua

NK News: In terms of global cities, where do you compare Pyongyang to architecturally?

It’s hard to compare it to other cities, but I would say the buildings built in the ’80s and ’90s could be compared with cities with a very strong history of public housing, mainly ex-Soviet States, and even Singapore. Their similarity in terms of layouts and even the choice of colors. But in terms of today’s high-rise social housing in North Korea, it’s very hard to compare it with other countries.

NK News: Do you see any similarities with South Korea?

Yes, in the apartment blocks that were built in the 80s. Similar to other rapidly developing cities where there is a need to house a growing urban population.

NK News: Why would there be that similarity when there was so little North-South cooperation in that era? Where could the joint influence have come from?

I don’t think these designs derive their similarities from culture or engagement, but rather the similarity is really a function of efficiency.

Most of the public housing blocks that were built around that time were all slab blocks, basically rectangular slabs extruded upwards. So it was very minimal and basic, very much characterizing the housing in many of developing countries like South Korea and Singapore at that point in time. That is why we see these similarities.

Today, however, we see a divergence because they have somehow evolved and they want to break away from a purely efficient building, adding in much more interesting geometries to their design.

Student works on designs | Picture: C. Chua

NK News: In terms of the ‘special projects’ that are coming up across Pyongyang recently, are these in response to capacity shortages in the city or are they like vanity projects to decorate the city?

I think they serve both purposes.

There is definitely a demand for more housing in the city, but at this point in time there is still a rising demand for apartments on places like Mirae Street and Ryomyong Street. And these are considered special projects because they are really designed to celebrate a particular moment in the history – to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea, for example.

NK News: And in terms of the resources required for these kinds of projects, is there any sense of where all that is coming from?

I think in terms of labor, it comes from the local construction industry, so all labor is supplied by the builders. And in terms of materials, one reason why they use a lot of concrete is that because it’s the one resource that’s available and is way more affordable than using steel, which they would need to import from China.

In terms of investments, a lot of the projects are driven by the state, although there are one or two exceptional projects that, what I heard, are basically joint ventures with Chinese developers.

NK News: Do you see a difference in quality between the joint ventures and the domestically invested designs?

I wouldn’t be able to comment on the quality, let’s say when you view the buildings up-close or when you are in the interior of the building. But if you were to compare the quality of the cladding materials, you do see a difference.

I think quality is differentiated according to the cost and also the prestige of development. For example, there is a distribution center that was jointly developed by a Singaporean developer which basically used better finishes and better cladding materials for their buildings as compared to some other developers that were in joint ventures with a Chinese company. They basically used locally sourced cladding materials.

NK News: There was a building collapse in 2014; do you sense from your conversations with local North Koreans in the field of architecture, engineering, or construction that lessons are being learned from that in any way?

It’s hard to get any response from them concerning the ‘incident.’ It seems like no one wants to talk about it – no response.

NK News: As an architect yourself looking at the city, do you fear there could be other ticking time bombs that may be likely to collapse because of hasty workmanship?

I think just by observing the structures, just by going past construction sites, it seems okay to me. But I would say the concern is not so much about structural issues or problems, but rather the things to do with insulation and waterproofing, which are real issues in Pyongyang.

NK News: So basically these buildings get cold and damp in winter?

I wouldn’t say they all get cold and damp. I do not know how bad the situation is, but they have been requesting more information on how to improve the quality of waterproofing and insulation.

NK News: Have you heard anything more about the Ryugyong Hotel? Are there any more plans for that or is it going to just stay as-is?

Good question. No one has a clue on what the future is for the Ryugyong Hotel.

Main Picture: C. Chua

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Chad O'Carroll

Crossing the line: Responding to North Korean provocation

A new book examines how the DPRK gets away with its over-the-top behavior

Rob York

September 26th, 2016

A tepid response from Washington to North Korean aggression has led to additional attacks by convincing Pyongyang that American threats aren’t to be taken seriously.

So argues Van Jackson of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in his book Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in U.S. North Korea Relations. He demonstrates that a series of incidents that were followed up by the U.S. backing down, and with one incident that did result in a show of force – Operation Paul Bunyan following the notorious 1976 ax murder incident in Panmunjom – resulted in fewer acts of violence against American personnel.

However, he told NK News that a broader Cold War context helps explain such fluctuations, especially after 1976.

He also said that, despite South Korea’s stronger reaction to the 2010 Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, the reduction of North Korean violence directed at South Koreans is unlikely to last, because “credibility has a shelf life.”

NK News: Where did the idea for this book come from?

Jackson: I was working on the “Korea desk” in the Pentagon during the Cheonan attack and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong in 2010. Those real-world crises – which everyone treated like the Cuban Missile Crisis at the time – had the feeling of manufactured ritual despite the high stakes. That whole experience gave rise to three personal frustrations.

Firstly, like everyone else, I was frustrated that these kinds of small-scale attacks kept happening. They’re the “pipsqueak fourth-rate power,” to quote Nixon, and yet we were the ones continually taking it on the chin? Second, I was even more frustrated by the “cycles of provocation” narrative that the U.S. government used to describe North Korean violence, not just because it conflated everything North Korea did as a “provocation,” which muddied the conceptual waters, but it also made it sound like we played no role in the tension dynamics.

They’re the “pipsqueak fourth-rate power,” to quote Nixon, and yet we were the ones continually taking it on the chin?

The third frustration was that everyone in the U.S. government liked to talk about “pressure” and “cost imposition” and “teaching North Korea a lesson,” yet in the heat of the moment those same people could think of nothing but the risk of escalation – chicken hawks.

I was starting to see a pattern: North Korea talks tough, we talk tough, North Korea gets violent, we back down… while talking even tougher. Over time, our policies were simultaneously inflaming hostility with an adversary while repeatedly showing them we did not seek to take any risks. That’s crazy, and untenable.

So I knew logically that a weak state will never repeatedly attack a stronger state unless they believe that the stronger state is unwilling to muster an adequate response. The research question just flowed from there. Did North Korea believe we wouldn’t respond to small-scale attacks? Why? So that got me interested in the history, and the rest is … well, history.

NK News: Your book describes a number of violent incidents the North has carried out against the United States that it’s difficult to imagine would be tolerated now, yet they were at the time. Those appear to halt after the tree-cutting incident: Does the U.S. response to that episode fully explain this or does the shift in overall Cold War dynamics play a role?

Jackson: Yeah, I think in the mythology of North Korea watching, the 1976 Panmunjom “ax murder” incident looms a little larger than it should, and the narrative I present in the book probably doesn’t help.

I was starting to see a pattern: North Korea talks tough, we talk tough, North Korea gets violent, we back down … while talking even tougher.

The short answer is that the U.S. response to that episode played a small but positive role. The long answer is that the resolve the alliance demonstrated with Operation Paul Bunyan put North Korea on notice, but only in the near term. That whole incident took place against a backdrop of us no longer being tied down in Vietnam, and a new presidential administration (Ford) coming into office feeling a need to be tougher reputationally given the withdrawal from Vietnam. So in context, we had fewer distractions on our foreign policy plate, and had established the year prior with the operation against Cambodia that we were willing to fight if messed with.

So all of that mixed together with our word and deed during the Panmunjom incident helped establish a credible deterrence posture for the first time in a while. But credibility has a shelf life, and your past actions won’t pay dividends forever. So it’s hard to say with a straight face that Operation Paul Bunyan is why North Korea has rarely attacked the US since 1976; it’s a real correlation, but it sounds ridiculous.

All quiet at the DMZ | Photo by Eric Lafforgue

The bigger explanation (for the lack of post-1976 violence) is that the context fundamentally changed: President Carter came to office in 1977 trying to withdrawal forces from Korea – which North Korea loved – and there was a short-lived attempt at rapprochement that alleviated the hostility that gave rise to violence.

But the whole rapprochement went nowhere because it was based on unrealistic assumptions on both our parts. By the time the hostility in Korea resumed, in the 1980s, North Korea’s basic strategy had changed to prioritize regime survival, not unification (at least not by force). They became more defensively minded.

NK News: You also devote some time to the South Korean response to the Yeonpyeong bombardment, and how the North has not committed a violent act since then. Do you expect this to last?

Jackson: I’m confident it won’t last. I think last year’s landmine incident along the DMZ was a harbinger of things to come. I have every expectation that Kim Jong Un’s big investment in strategic forces (32 missile tests in less than five years!) since he came to power will eventually give rise to patterns of low-level hostility and violence akin to the 1960s, but with a wider range of options than just DMZ violence.

…in the 1980s, North Korea’s basic strategy had changed to prioritize regime survival, not unification (at least not by force). They became more defensively minded.

It’s possible that South Korea’s tougher posture post-2010 has helped deter North Korea from an attack since then, but even if that’s true (and I think it’s only partly true), that’s huge cause for concern – credibility has a shelf life, and South Korea can’t rely on a tough posture to pay dividends indefinitely without being tested – with violence – eventually.

NK News: You’ve speculated about the possibility of a limited war on the peninsula. How might this scenario come about and what would keep the conflict “limited?”

Jackson: I think limited war comes about from the natural and inevitable retaliation that occurs in response to a future North Korean small-scale attack; at some point there will be a price for perpetuating hostility while demonstrating a history of restraint when attacked. What would keep it limited? Self-preservation.

I think last year’s landmine incident along the DMZ was a harbinger of things to come.

Some people like to say that you shouldn’t make a rational actor assumption about North Korea. Perhaps you shouldn’t make that a priori assumption, but you should certainly draw that conclusion from their behavioral patterns over time; history tells us North Korea’s ruling regime is rational, and more to the point, Kim Jong Un is rational. They show restraint when they could escalate.

They pick their battles wisely (for the most part). They execute strategies. They engage in purposeful violence. These are indicators of a rational actor. I mention all this because it is rationality – a history of prudence and measured restraint – that suggests North Korea is not suicidal.

North Korea’s 2013 “mainland U.S. strike plan” | Source: KCNA

If they’re not suicidal, then their desire to stay in power will keep them from engaging in nuclear attacks and total war unless they believe their days are numbered. So the calculation for us becomes: How do we maintain credible deterrence while convincing them that their days aren’t numbered just because we retaliate when attacked?

That’s the challenge facing us now. Talk of unification, nuclear umbrellas, total war, forced regime change; all of that stuff is frankly irresponsible if you ask me, but we’ve gotten so accustomed to planning and exercising and talking as if it’s still the 1980s. You don’t do that stuff to a regime with nukes.

I mention all this because it is rationality – a history of prudence and measured restraint – that suggests North Korea is not suicidal.

NK News: Do you see current trends in U.S. politics affecting the “reputation” of America vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula? Namely, with one presidential candidate questioning the U.S. role on the peninsula might the North question U.S. resolve?

Jackson: I think we have to wait and see. Obviously Korean policy elites are freaking out right now. But the alliance has survived extreme threats of abandoning Korea during presidential elections before (during both the Nixon and Carter presidencies). Based on those cases, I’d say we have a strong (if dated) track record of alliance resilience in the face of domestic political pressures, though if I were Korean I’d probably be worried.

We’ve gotten so accustomed to planning and exercising and talking as if it’s still the 1980s. You don’t do that stuff to a regime with nukes.

The reality is there’s a strong consensus in the U.S. – especially the foreign policy community – in favor of maintaining military superiority over potential competitors and assured access to the global commons. Those two things require forward military presence and reliable alliances, especially given the geography of the Pacific.

So political types who hate the alliance or feel like it’s a bad deal for America will have a very difficult time making dramatic changes to Korea policy unless they have a theory of the case for how they’ll be able to maintain military superiority and assured access in Asia. Because for better or worse, willfully reducing American power will never be a mainstream view, and it’s nearly impossible to make a case for ending alliances while maintaining American power – especially in Asia.

Featured Image: Colonel at DMZ - North Korea by Eric Lafforgue on 2011-09-11 08:25:10

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Rob York

Rob York is a feature writer for NK News and Ph.D candidate in Korean history at the University of Hawaii at Manoa.

View from the bridge: Signs of change on the N.Korea-China border?

In the border city economic shift is underway - but little appears to change in the DPRK

Andrei Lankov

September 28th, 2016

Usually I go to Dandong once every year or two, but this year was an exception, and in late August, I spent a few days in what is North Korea’s major access point to the outside world. Among other things, it was interesting to learn about what had recently happened in a town that since January has seen a chain of dramatic events, above all, the nuclear test in January and the introduction of the toughest ever sanctions in March.

Of course, all the observations that I am going to share with readers should be taken with a grain of salt: my contacts, overwhelmingly owners of medium-sized businesses, are not in a position to see the big picture and are not privy to state secrets. Nonetheless, they live there and have good reason to know what is going on.

THE MOOD ON THE GROUND

Dandong and its twin city of Sinuiju form the major trade and transport link between North Korea and the outside word. Various estimates indicate that between two-thirds and three-quarters of North Korea’s entire foreign trade pass the old bridge built in 1943 that connects these two cities.

The atmosphere is palpably more tense now. Many people who were willing to meet me last time were reluctant or outright refused to share a table with me.

Dandong can also rival Shenyang in the competition for the title of North Korea’s unofficial foreign trade hub. It’s a place where many (over one hundred) North Korean foreign trade companies operate, making precious hard currency for both the North Korean government and the fast-growing North Korean business elite – the line between the two is often rather blurry nowadays.

So what has changed in the eight or so months since my previous trip there?

The atmosphere is palpably more tense now. Many people who were willing to meet me last time were reluctant or outright refused to share a table with me. North Korean people in the area have started steering clear of potentially dangerous looking contacts, even if such caution is not good for their balance sheet.

A CRACKDOWN

From what I could see, it appears that the Chinese authorities are seemingly quite serious about implementing sanctions under UN Security Council Resolution #2270. Some of my acquaintances who were once involved in the mineral resource trade say that, in recent months, such activities have come to a near complete halt.

A fruit stall on the DPRK-China border | Photo by Jonathan Kos-Read

Granted, there is some smuggling, but the scale is much smaller than regular, legal trade – which used to sustain quite a few local businesses. Most of the time, it is the expensive resources like iron, zinc, copper or even gold that are smuggled. Some more entrepreneurial types even illicitly move coal as well. For such operations, they use small river ships that can haul 100-200 tons of coal.

Some of my acquaintances who were once involved in the mineral resource trade say that, in recent months, such activities have come to a near complete halt.

The ships, quietly loaded on the North Korean bank, will cross the river in the early hours of the morning and arrive in places where a number of trucks are waiting to rendezvous with them. These river pirates cannot be faulted for their boldness, but it still seems that trade in minerals has largely died – at least, so long far as small and medium sized businesses are concerned.

In some cases, the customs authorities have started to take a harder line in even rather innocuous lines of trade. In one instance, I was told about a Chinese company that has been selling tractors and agricultural equipment to North Korea for decades. In the last couple of years, thanks to the improvement in North Korea’s agriculture, business has been rather brisk, but in the last few months, the company has started to run into a number of issues.

In some cases, the customs authorities have started to take a harder line in even rather innocuous lines of trade.

The authorities believe, or say they believe that tractors and diesel engines are potentially dual-purpose, and thus controlled under sanctions.

This seems to be a rather common situation. Another contact mentioned that a company specializing in sales of the upmarket consumer electronics also ran into similar problems recently. Selling any kind of equipment to North Korea has suddenly become an item of keen interest and scrutiny for China’s mercurial and rather byzantine bureaucracy.

FEELING THE SQUEEZE?

There are different opinions on whether sanctions have started to be felt economically in North Korea. However, seen from Dandong, it appears that it is still largely business as usual in North Korea. Frankly, in the decade or so that I have visited the area, I have never seen so many electric lights on the North Korean side of the river at nighttime. Sinuiju is not exactly bathed with light, but it is not the black hole it once was either.

…seen from Dandong, it appears that it is still largely business as usual in North Korea

What’s more, they’ve even started selling cars and minivans to North Korea – a number of such vehicles are parked in front of the custom offices. A keen observer can tell that they are for North Korean customers because there are special Chinese/Korean bilingual notices that say these vehicles are for export, and there are also nearby shops selling spare parts for said vehicles.

The border | Photo by michael-day

Otherwise, what is being sold has not changed much if compared with a year ago. As per last time, electrical equipment that allows households to survive without reliable electricity from a grid continues to be popular. Small generators, batteries, and above all, solar panels, are sold everywhere.

Some shops even advertise a full set for an electrically self-sustaining household. Such set includes solar panels, generators and batteries, as well as wires and transformers. Household items, too, like kitchen utensils and especially rice cookers are selling very well, as are clothing and shoes.

There are also still a large number of shops with Korean language advertising that sell construction materials, everything from tiles to bricks to wallpaper. However, shops selling computers and DVD players, once ubiquitous, are now few and far between.

PLUS ÇA CHANGE

Imports from North Korea are now dominated by garments and seafood. Most of the seafood comes from North Korea via Sinuiju to Dandong where it is first processed and then sold to cities inside China or overseas, mainly Japan and South Korea). Of course, when sold outside China, the product is not labeled as North Korean produce to avoid potential complications.

However, shops selling computers and DVD players, once ubiquitous, are now few and far between.

It seems that business as usual also continues at the factories employing North Korean workers. Of all Chinese cities, Dandong seemingly has the highest number of North Korean workers – 15-20,000. However, they are not very visible, under constant surveillance and usually not allowed to leave their factories. Groups of workers can only sometimes be seen in markets and shops where they go to buy items necessary for daily life.

North Korean restaurants are still present in large numbers, but they are usually empty nowadays. For the Chinese, these restaurants are seriously overpriced, with meals costing two or even three times the price of the equivalent sold in a Chinese restaurant.

In the past, a significant number of patrons were South Korean tourists, but they are now banned from visiting by both the North and South Korean governments. As most readers surely remember, a few months ago it was reported that North Korean restaurants had banned South Koreans from coming, but it seems that this ban is not universally enforced: I have heard from South Koreans that they have no problems in Beijing or Moscow in such places.

But in Dandong, they are serious about enforcing this ban – to the point of comical.

Indeed, this ban was the reason why I had one of the most bizarre experiences of my life. When I and a friend wanted to enter a North Korean restaurant (for the record, it was the Samchonli restaurant on the river bank and it was late August), we were intercepted by a rather unfriendly looking North Korean waitress who demanded that we produce ID in order to show that we were not South Koreans.

For your information, both my friend and I are rather pale and unmistakenly Caucasian, but we were not allowed in before our passports were carefully checked (a Russian passport created additional trouble because they didn’t know what Cyrillic was).

It remains to be seen what, if anything, will change now, since the new nuclear test will have some impact on the Chinese attitude and, hence, on the city of Dandong.

It is interesting that recently in Dandong, North Korean waitresses have also begun to appear in Chinese-owned restaurants and coffee shops. They work there as contract workers – like North Korean workers who are employed in seafood processing plants or electronics assembly factories.

As usual, Dandong remains the home of a large number of North Korean ‘trade representatives’, many of whom are basically private entrepreneurs in all but name. Recent economic troubles have had some adverse impact on their wellbeing, but people in the know say that established North Korean businesses with enough capital and connections continue to operate with reasonable profits. It is largely the smaller businesses that are suffering under the pressure of sanctions and Chinese crackdowns.

However, an important warning is needed: keep in mind that this was a description of the situation in late August, before the fifth nuclear test. At the time, it was widely expected that China would soon relax its stance on North Korea, annoyed by South Korea’s decision to deploy THAAD anti-missile system.

It remains to be seen what, if anything, will change now, since the new nuclear test will have some impact on the Chinese attitude and, hence, on the city of Dandong.

Featured Image: Dandong, Liaoning Province by Prince Roy on 2007-10-20 14:38:21

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Andrei Lankov

The United States and South Korea are destined to "pay the price" for their decision to deploy an advanced missile defence system which will inevitably prompt a "counter attack", China's top newspaper said.

The United States and South Korea are destined to "pay the price" for their decision to deploy an advanced missile defence system which will inevitably prompt a "counter attack", China's top newspaper said.

This year has seen heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula, starting with North Korea's fourth nuclear test in January, which was followed by a satellite launch, a string of tests of various missiles, and its fifth and largest nuclear test last month.

In July, South Korea agreed with the United States to deploy the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) anti-missile system to protect against any North Korean threats.

South Korea aims to deploy the system on a golf course, a defence ministry official said on Friday.

But the plan has angered China, concerned THAAD's powerful radar would compromise its security and do nothing to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

In a commentary, the ruling Communist Party's official People's Daily said China's opposition to THAAD would never change as the program was a serious threat to the regional strategic security balance.

"Like any other country, China can neither be vague nor indifferent on security matters that affect its core interests," the newspaper said in the commentary, published under the pen name "Zhong Sheng", meaning "Voice of China", often used to give views on foreign policy.

It said the United States and South Korea needed to wake up to the fact the Korean Peninsula was not a place to take risks.

"If the United States and South Korea harm the strategic security interests of countries in the region including China, then they are destined to pay the price for this and receive a proper counter attack," the paper said.