Saturday, 1 October 2016

US ROK EXERCISES OUTSIDE THE USUAL CIRCLE

U.S., ROK showcase anti-sub capabilities in show of force
U.S., ROK showcase anti-sub capabilities in show of force
First time U.S.- ROK maritime drills conducted outside of the routine exercise cycle
September 26th, 2016
The U.S. and Republic of Korea navies (ROKN) joined forces on Monday to conduct combined maritime exercises in the East Sea to demonstrate their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and precision strike capabilities two weeks after North Korea’s fifth nuclear test.
The combined maritime drills were undertaken outside of the routine exercise cycle “for the first time” in a show of force against the North’s recent and continuing provocations, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Fleet and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea (CNFK) said in a press release.
The U.S. and the South hold joint military exercises such as Key Resolve, Foal Eagle, and Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) on a yearly basis.
The operation saw the U.S. and South Korean navies join forces to identify and track an enemy submarine in various scenarios through ASW, and to carry out pinpoint strikes against enemy forces.
The guided-missile destroyer USS Spruance (DDG 111, Right) takes on a fuel line from the Australian oiler HMAS Success (OR 304) during a refueling at South China sea. (July 27, 2016)  I Credit: U.S. Navy photo
The guided-missile destroyer USS Spruance (DDG 111, Right) takes on a fuel line from the Australian oiler HMAS Success (OR 304) during a refueling at South China sea (July 27, 2016) | Credit: U.S. Navy
USS Spruance (DDG 111) – an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer – and Aegis destroyers Yulgok-yiyi from the South were involved. The P-3 Orion land-based maritime patrol, ASW helicopters Lynx, and submarines also joined the drills.
“This combined maritime operation is another example of the broad range of capabilities the alliance has to confront North Korea’s unacceptable behavior and the threat they pose to the stability on the Korean Peninsula, and the region,” General Vincent Brooks, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Commander said in a written statement released by USFK.
Two B-1B Lancers, U.S. supersonic nuclear-capable bombers, were recently dispatched to South Korean airspace as part of a joint show of strength against Pyongyang.
Two bombers were opened up for public inspection during an air show in South Korea this Saturday and Sunday.
Aegis destroyers Yulgok-yiyi (Left) during fleet review (October 17, 2015) I Source: Republic of Korea Armed Forces
Aegis destroyers Yulgok-yiyi (Left) during fleet review (October 17, 2015) | Source: Republic of Korea Armed Forces
An expert based in South Korea said the drills were an obvious response to the North’s heightened military and nuclear threats.
“The USS Spruance destroyer has equipped with SM-3 (Standard Missile-3) which is a ship-launched anti-ballistic missile. And radar-equipped destroyer Yulgok-yiyi can detect missiles, but it doesn’t have SM-3 to shoot down the target [at high altitude],” Moon Keun-sik, the director of the Korea Defense and Security Forum (KODEF), told NK News.
Moon pointed out it was the Yulgok-yiyi and Seoae Ryu Seong-ryong destroyers (DDG 993), along with the Sejong the Great class destroyer (DDG-991), that detected the North’s long-range rocket Unha-3 test in December 12, 2012.
All three ships are armed with a version of the SM-2 missile, which can function as a makeshift lower-tier ballistic missile interceptor.
The SM-3 is designed to intercept at up to about 200 kilometers, while the SM-2 is a lower-tier interceptor. A Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) defense system can only intercept missiles in the terminal phase at an altitude of about 40-150 km over South Korean territory.
“…the combined military drills are aimed to detect a projectile launched from the North’s SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) at an early stage [by utilizing Yulgok-yiyi] and to bring down the target [at higher tier] by using SM-3,” Moon added.
“It is expected for the U.S.-ROK alliance to conduct such training, especially faced with North Korea having a large submarine fleet,” John Grisafi, director of intelligence at NK News said. “Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is a something of an art, though it involves a lot of science and technological methods, which requires continual practice.”
The biggest and newest known North Korean submarine is its Sinpo-class (also known as Gorae-class) vessel, and it can carry a single Pukkuksong-1 SLBM with a displacement of just 2,000 tons, previous NK News analysis indicated.
“The history of operations against the South by the North using submarines, such as the sinking of the ROK’s Cheonan in 2010, and the Gangneung submarine infiltration incident in 1996,” Grisafi added, made it likely that these exercises are will continue.
Featured Image: U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), Published on September 26th 

U.S. electoral system is ‘rigged’ with corruption, N.Korea says Rodong Sinmun editorial heavily critical of Democrats, while almost silent on Republicans

U.S. electoral system is ‘rigged’ with corruption, N.Korea says
U.S. electoral system is ‘rigged’ with corruption, N.Korea says
Rodong Sinmun editorial heavily critical of Democrats, while almost silent on Republicans
September 28th, 2016
The U.S. Presidential election system is rigged with corruption, North Korean state media said a day after the first U.S. Presidential debate held on Tuesday, Korea time.
While the article refrained from directly mentioning Presidential hopefuls Donald J. Trump or Hilary Clinton, it heavily criticized the Democratic Party while remaining almost silent on the Republicans.
“I truly feel sorry for the U.S. citizens who have to entrust the country to these people, who are blinded by the gold,” the editorial published in the Wednesday edition of Rodong Sinmun said.
“…the U.S.’ election campaign is the fanfare of dogfights among money grabbers, the stage of the law of the jungle tainted with fraud and deception.”
Titled “a dirty fight among madmen blinded by the gold,” the North Korean article started by slamming the current U.S. Presidental election system for its alleged focus on campaign spending, and not about the candidate’s political insight or the party’s platform.
The North even made reference to WikiLeaks’s July leak of thousands of Democratic National Committee emails.
“About 19,000 leaked emails have clearly exposed on how the Democratic Party is maneuvering behind the scenes to rip off the election campaign funds from the leading contributors,” it read.
Rodong Sinmun, the biggest North Korean publication for domestic readers, provided numerical figures to give readers a more clear idea on the size of the so-called “corruption.”
Describing a Democratic Party event for major donors, and the top-tier package that the party offers, Rodong slammed these are the “clear results of behind-the-scenes dealings to prepare for the election funds.”
While the 500-word editorial bashed the Democratic Party, it did not attack the current Republican Party and made only one reference to George W. Bush’s administration to criticize the party.
“It is a disclosed fact that in 2004, the U.S. Capitol under the control of the Republican Party let the Assault Weapons Ban to expire on behalf of the arms dealers, who were slipping enormous amount of money,” Rodong said.
A longtime North Korea watcher told NK News that the editorial is “a classic Marxist-Leninist critique of electoral systems in capitalist countries.”
“Large monopolistic conglomerates pour money behind the candidates so they can be selected to represent the interests of the capitalist class and not the common people,” Dr. Daniel Pinkston, a professor at Troy University said.
So far, the North Korean government has not officially stated on whether the regime favors one candidate over another, although it has hinted at an admiration for Trump.
On May 18, the U.S. Presidential hopeful Donald Trump said he “would speak to Kim Jong Un” to “talk some sense” to the North Korean leader, in contrast to the current Obama administration’s “strategic patience” policy towards the Pyongyang government.
About two weeks after Trump’s remark on Kim Jong Un, the North published an editorial on a state-run outlet calling him a “wise politician” and “far-sighted presidential candidate.”
Pinkston argued that Pyongyang believes Trump’s views on East Asia would be more aligned with its strategic interests.
“His views on U.S. alliances probably raise some hopes in Pyongyang that he would terminate U.S. alliances in East Asia and withdraw from the region, essentially retreating into neo-isolationism,” Pinkston said.
But another expert based in Seoul argued that the editorial – slamming the overall U.S. political system without clearly favoring one candidate – is an indicator that Pyongyang’s American policy will remain the same no matter who gets elected this November.
“Whoever becomes the U.S. President, Pyongyang is saying that it will stand on an equal footing with the U.S. as the part of nuclear-weapon states,” Dr. Cha Du-Hyegn, former secretary to President Lee Myung-bak for crisis information, told NK News.
Featured Image: FlickrWikimedia Commons, edited by NK News

Pyongyang architecture: Transforming design in N. Korea’s capital

Pyongyang architecture: Transforming design in N. Korea’s capital
Singapore-based architect talks bringing diversity to a city more famous for concrete blocks
September 29th, 2016
Despite a reputation for Soviet-era design, overt political propaganda and gray, imposing skylines, North Korean approaches to architectural design have been changing with increasing pace in recent years.
Once a city dominated by uniform Eastern European-style super-blocks, a look at the ever-changing skyline of Pyongyang shows architects are being given increased freedom to design creatively. The result: a more individualistic and street-based approach to design, with buildings in the North Korean capital increasingly colorful, curved, but still overwhelmingly concrete.
Observing and now contributing towards the evolution of North Korean architectural design is award-winning Singaporean architect, Calvin Chua, who, for the past two years, has been directing and managing the Architectural Association’s (AA) Visiting School in Pyongyang.
The Visiting School, managed in collaboration with Choson Exchange – an NGO specializing in in-country DPRK capacity building – brings foreign architects and designers to participate in ten-day exchange programs within the North Korean capital. The goal is to foster new ideas among local architects and urban planners while also offering scope for on-the-ground research and understanding of local approaches to those participating from overseas.
But what, exactly, attracts architects to North Korea? How and why is design changing there? And are lessons being learned from the past?
Architect Calvin Chua | Picture: Calvin Chua
Architect Calvin Chua | Picture: Calvin Chua

NK News: Is there anything notable about the architecture in North Korea that readers might not be aware of?
Calvin Chua: I think the most notable aspect of North Korean architecture for first-time visitors is the monumental buildings coated with a pastel colored paint and planned according to major visual axes.
But I guess what’s interesting about North Korean architecture and urban planning is that often buildings are designed in a very literal way.
For example, we were recently brought to see the latest development at the Central Zoo, a reptile enclosure designed by one of the local co-tutors. Inside it has an amazing double-curved roof that, in my opinion, is very well resolved using steel frames (very unusual in North Korea because all buildings are built with concrete rather than steel). On the exterior, however, the roof that you see from the interior is actually a shell of a turtle or a tortoise.
So on the exterior it looks really literal: that it’s an amphibious or reptile enclosure. But from the interior you get to appreciate a piece of architecture that is common in the rest of the world.
I guess this project reveals tension in developing a contemporary architectural language within their local context – how they negotiate the difference between something that is abstract versus something that is literal.
reptile-enclosure
Reptile enclosure at Pyongyang Zoo | Picture: C. Chua
On the urban development side, I think what’s interesting is that in the early years, the development of Pyongyang was based on the urban block, a super block measuring 200 meters by 200 meters, similar to how Eastern European and ex-Soviet States were planned. But at some point, from the 70s and 80s onwards, you start to see developments sprouting up based on the design of streets.
So Tongil Street, Kwongbok Street, together with the new special projects are taking place at the scale of the street. The reason being – I think that visually – is because the street is able to create a more dynamic environment through the perspectival views.
Another related change I recently observed is that some of the new streets are designed as a collection of individual towers. For example, Mirae Street is really like a mini-Manhattan, where each building has different characteristics from its neighboring one. This is quite different from the past, where the buildings were well-coordinated along a street.
inside-reptile-enclosure-nk
Inside the enclosure | Picture: C. Chua
NK News: Do North Korea’s architects take a mainly domestic ‘Juche’ approach to design or is there a clear outside influence from certain regions or countries? 
I think just from observing Pyongyang, it appears that North Korea architecture and urbanism has evolved over the years.
Starting off in the ’50s and ’60s there was a lot of influence from the Soviet Union and its other satellite states, and therefore some of the buildings at that point in time were prefabricated. Now, however, most of the buildings are cast in situ, partly because there is no longer such technical assistance and also because the local builders are more familiar with in-situ concrete casting. So to some extent, you can see that the level of external influence or reference does affect the method of construction.
And in terms of the exterior form of building, I think it has gone through several iterations; from a neo-classical building style in the ’50s that evolved to the modernist style in the ’60s and ’70s and the neo-Korean/Juche-style, which was basically Juche architecture with Korean characteristics, in the ‘80s.
Today, I think it’s really a mishmash of influence, where a lot of the style is referenced from what is being developed overseas and domestically in North Korea. I think that while they try to be more inventive but they are also restricted by the construction methods and also the resources available. For example, if they would like to have a more geometrically complex design, there is a limitation in terms of how much they are able to curve the building.
NK News: Who are North Korea’s famous architects?
I don’t think it’s possible to identify a key architect in North Korea because the entire system basically supports a collective architectural body and a collective architectural identity. So even though we know who were the key individuals that worked on certain projects, they are always represented as an entire collective body.
arch-tour-dprk
Visitors participating in the AA Visiting School, Pyongyang | Picture: C. Chua
NK News: In terms of global cities, where do you compare Pyongyang to architecturally?
It’s hard to compare it to other cities, but I would say the buildings built in the ’80s and ’90s could be compared with cities with a very strong history of public housing, mainly ex-Soviet States, and even Singapore. Their similarity in terms of layouts and even the choice of colors. But in terms of today’s high-rise social housing in North Korea, it’s very hard to compare it with other countries.
NK News: Do you see any similarities with South Korea?
Yes, in the apartment blocks that were built in the 80s. Similar to other rapidly developing cities where there is a need to house a growing urban population.
NK News: Why would there be that similarity when there was so little North-South cooperation in that era? Where could the joint influence have come from?
I don’t think these designs derive their similarities from culture or engagement, but rather the similarity is really a function of efficiency.
Most of the public housing blocks that were built around that time were all slab blocks, basically rectangular slabs extruded upwards. So it was very minimal and basic, very much characterizing the housing in many of developing countries like South Korea and Singapore at that point in time. That is why we see these similarities.
Today, however, we see a divergence because they have somehow evolved and they want to break away from a purely efficient building, adding in much more interesting geometries to their design.
female-architect
Student works on designs | Picture: C. Chua
NK News: In terms of the ‘special projects’ that are coming up across Pyongyang recently, are these in response to capacity shortages in the city or are they like vanity projects to decorate the city?
I think they serve both purposes.
There is definitely a demand for more housing in the city, but at this point in time there is still a rising demand for apartments on places like Mirae Street and Ryomyong Street. And these are considered special projects because they are really designed to celebrate a particular moment in the history – to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea, for example.
NK News: And in terms of the resources required for these kinds of projects, is there any sense of where all that is coming from?
I think in terms of labor, it comes from the local construction industry, so all labor is supplied by the builders. And in terms of materials, one reason why they use a lot of concrete is that because it’s the one resource that’s available and is way more affordable than using steel, which they would need to import from China.
In terms of investments, a lot of the projects are driven by the state, although there are one or two exceptional projects that, what I heard, are basically joint ventures with Chinese developers.
NK News: Do you see a difference in quality between the joint ventures and the domestically invested designs?
I wouldn’t be able to comment on the quality, let’s say when you view the buildings up-close or when you are in the interior of the building. But if you were to compare the quality of the cladding materials, you do see a difference.
I think quality is differentiated according to the cost and also the prestige of development. For example, there is a distribution center that was jointly developed by a Singaporean developer which basically used better finishes and better cladding materials for their buildings as compared to some other developers that were in joint ventures with a Chinese company. They basically used locally sourced cladding materials.
NK News: There was a building collapse in 2014; do you sense from your conversations with local North Koreans in the field of architecture, engineering, or construction that lessons are being learned from that in any way?
It’s hard to get any response from them concerning the ‘incident.’ It seems like no one wants to talk about it – no response.
NK News: As an architect yourself looking at the city, do you fear there could be other ticking time bombs that may be likely to collapse because of hasty workmanship?
I think just by observing the structures, just by going past construction sites, it seems okay to me. But I would say the concern is not so much about structural issues or problems, but rather the things to do with insulation and waterproofing, which are real issues in Pyongyang.
NK News: So basically these buildings get cold and damp in winter?
I wouldn’t say they all get cold and damp. I do not know how bad the situation is, but they have been requesting more information on how to improve the quality of waterproofing and insulation.
NK News: Have you heard anything more about the Ryugyong Hotel? Are there any more plans for that or is it going to just stay as-is?
Good question. No one has a clue on what the future is for the Ryugyong Hotel.
Main Picture: C. Chua

Crossing the line: Responding to North Korean provocation

Crossing the line: Responding to North Korean provocation
Crossing the line: Responding to North Korean provocation
A new book examines how the DPRK gets away with its over-the-top behavior
September 26th, 2016
A tepid response from Washington to North Korean aggression has led to additional attacks by convincing Pyongyang that American threats aren’t to be taken seriously.
So argues Van Jackson of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in his book Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in U.S. North Korea Relations. He demonstrates that a series of incidents that were followed up by the U.S. backing down, and with one incident that did result in a show of force – Operation Paul Bunyan following the notorious 1976 ax murder incident in Panmunjom – resulted in fewer acts of violence against American personnel.
However, he told NK News that a broader Cold War context helps explain such fluctuations, especially after 1976. 
He also said that, despite South Korea’s stronger reaction to the 2010 Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, the reduction of North Korean violence directed at South Koreans is unlikely to last, because “credibility has a shelf life.”
NK News: Where did the idea for this book come from?
Jackson: I was working on the “Korea desk” in the Pentagon during the Cheonan attack and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong in 2010. Those real-world crises – which everyone treated like the Cuban Missile Crisis at the time – had the feeling of manufactured ritual despite the high stakes. That whole experience gave rise to three personal frustrations. 
Firstly, like everyone else, I was frustrated that these kinds of small-scale attacks kept happening. They’re the “pipsqueak fourth-rate power,” to quote Nixon, and yet we were the ones continually taking it on the chin? Second, I was even more frustrated by the “cycles of provocation” narrative that the U.S. government used to describe North Korean violence, not just because it conflated everything North Korea did as a “provocation,” which muddied the conceptual waters, but it also made it sound like we played no role in the tension dynamics.
They’re the “pipsqueak fourth-rate power,” to quote Nixon, and yet we were the ones continually taking it on the chin? 
The third frustration was that everyone in the U.S. government liked to talk about “pressure” and “cost imposition” and “teaching North Korea a lesson,” yet in the heat of the moment those same people could think of nothing but the risk of escalation – chicken hawks. 
I was starting to see a pattern: North Korea talks tough, we talk tough, North Korea gets violent, we back down… while talking even tougher. Over time, our policies were simultaneously inflaming hostility with an adversary while repeatedly showing them we did not seek to take any risks. That’s crazy, and untenable. 
So I knew logically that a weak state will never repeatedly attack a stronger state unless they believe that the stronger state is unwilling to muster an adequate response. The research question just flowed from there. Did North Korea believe we wouldn’t respond to small-scale attacks? Why? So that got me interested in the history, and the rest is … well, history. 
NK News: Your book describes a number of violent incidents the North has carried out against the United States that it’s difficult to imagine would be tolerated now, yet they were at the time. Those appear to halt after the tree-cutting incident: Does the U.S. response to that episode fully explain this or does the shift in overall Cold War dynamics play a role? 
Jackson: Yeah, I think in the mythology of North Korea watching, the 1976 Panmunjom “ax murder” incident looms a little larger than it should, and the narrative I present in the book probably doesn’t help.
I was starting to see a pattern: North Korea talks tough, we talk tough, North Korea gets violent, we back down … while talking even tougher. 
The short answer is that the U.S. response to that episode played a small but positive role. The long answer is that the resolve the alliance demonstrated with Operation Paul Bunyan put North Korea on notice, but only in the near term. That whole incident took place against a backdrop of us no longer being tied down in Vietnam, and a new presidential administration (Ford) coming into office feeling a need to be tougher reputationally given the withdrawal from Vietnam. So in context, we had fewer distractions on our foreign policy plate, and had established the year prior with the operation against Cambodia that we were willing to fight if messed with. 
So all of that mixed together with our word and deed during the Panmunjom incident helped establish a credible deterrence posture for the first time in a while. But credibility has a shelf life, and your past actions won’t pay dividends forever. So it’s hard to say with a straight face that Operation Paul Bunyan is why North Korea has rarely attacked the US since 1976; it’s a real correlation, but it sounds ridiculous.
panmunjon photo
All quiet at the DMZ | Photo by Eric Lafforgue
The bigger explanation (for the lack of post-1976 violence) is that the context fundamentally changed: President Carter came to office in 1977 trying to withdrawal forces from Korea – which North Korea loved – and there was a short-lived attempt at rapprochement that alleviated the hostility that gave rise to violence.
But the whole rapprochement went nowhere because it was based on unrealistic assumptions on both our parts. By the time the hostility in Korea resumed, in the 1980s, North Korea’s basic strategy had changed to prioritize regime survival, not unification (at least not by force). They became more defensively minded.
NK News: You also devote some time to the South Korean response to the Yeonpyeong bombardment, and how the North has not committed a violent act since then. Do you expect this to last? 
Jackson: I’m confident it won’t last. I think last year’s landmine incident along the DMZ was a harbinger of things to come. I have every expectation that Kim Jong Un’s big investment in strategic forces (32 missile tests in less than five years!) since he came to power will eventually give rise to patterns of low-level hostility and violence akin to the 1960s, but with a wider range of options than just DMZ violence. 
…in the 1980s, North Korea’s basic strategy had changed to prioritize regime survival, not unification (at least not by force). They became more defensively minded.
It’s possible that South Korea’s tougher posture post-2010 has helped deter North Korea from an attack since then, but even if that’s true (and I think it’s only partly true), that’s huge cause for concern – credibility has a shelf life, and South Korea can’t rely on a tough posture to pay dividends indefinitely without being tested – with violence – eventually. 
NK News: You’ve speculated about the possibility of a limited war on the peninsula. How might this scenario come about and what would keep the conflict “limited?” 
Jackson: I think limited war comes about from the natural and inevitable retaliation that occurs in response to a future North Korean small-scale attack; at some point there will be a price for perpetuating hostility while demonstrating a history of restraint when attacked. What would keep it limited? Self-preservation.
I think last year’s landmine incident along the DMZ was a harbinger of things to come. 
Some people like to say that you shouldn’t make a rational actor assumption about North Korea. Perhaps you shouldn’t make that a priori assumption, but you should certainly draw that conclusion from their behavioral patterns over time; history tells us North Korea’s ruling regime is rational, and more to the point, Kim Jong Un is rational. They show restraint when they could escalate. 
They pick their battles wisely (for the most part). They execute strategies. They engage in purposeful violence. These are indicators of a rational actor. I mention all this because it is rationality – a history of prudence and measured restraint – that suggests North Korea is not suicidal.
North Korea's 2013 "mainland U.S. strike plan" | Source: KCNA
North Korea’s 2013 “mainland U.S. strike plan” | Source: KCNA
If they’re not suicidal, then their desire to stay in power will keep them from engaging in nuclear attacks and total war unless they believe their days are numbered. So the calculation for us becomes: How do we maintain credible deterrence while convincing them that their days aren’t numbered just because we retaliate when attacked? 
That’s the challenge facing us now. Talk of unification, nuclear umbrellas, total war, forced regime change; all of that stuff is frankly irresponsible if you ask me, but we’ve gotten so accustomed to planning and exercising and talking as if it’s still the 1980s. You don’t do that stuff to a regime with nukes.
I mention all this because it is rationality – a history of prudence and measured restraint – that suggests North Korea is not suicidal. 
NK News: Do you see current trends in U.S. politics affecting the “reputation” of America vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula? Namely, with one presidential candidate questioning the U.S. role on the peninsula might the North question U.S. resolve? 

Jackson: I think we have to wait and see. Obviously Korean policy elites are freaking out right now. But the alliance has survived extreme threats of abandoning Korea during presidential elections before (during both the Nixon and Carter presidencies). Based on those cases, I’d say we have a strong (if dated) track record of alliance resilience in the face of domestic political pressures, though if I were Korean I’d probably be worried.
We’ve gotten so accustomed to planning and exercising and talking as if it’s still the 1980s. You don’t do that stuff to a regime with nukes. 
The reality is there’s a strong consensus in the U.S. – especially the foreign policy community – in favor of maintaining military superiority over potential competitors and assured access to the global commons. Those two things require forward military presence and reliable alliances, especially given the geography of the Pacific.
So political types who hate the alliance or feel like it’s a bad deal for America will have a very difficult time making dramatic changes to Korea policy unless they have a theory of the case for how they’ll be able to maintain military superiority and assured access in Asia. Because for better or worse, willfully reducing American power will never be a mainstream view, and it’s nearly impossible to make a case for ending alliances while maintaining American power – especially in Asia. 
Featured Image: Colonel at DMZ - North Korea by Eric Lafforgue on 2011-09-11 08:25:10