The Turtle House

Wednesday 7 October 2015

Apparently Australia's views on who are Moderate Rebels in the Syrian war includes those 'freedom fighters' who eat the beating hearts of their enemy in a blissful sexual hubris. That's who my country supports. I don't. Good luck Russia, doing a good thing. It's almost near impossible to do a good thing in this world. You are brave to try. I respect you a lot. As an Australian I do not support the sick fucking twisted pariah 'freedom fighters' of Syria in their Wahabi Wannabe Power Sex Hysteria ruling blitz. Who the fuck do these cunts think they are?

Go back to Saudi where your social values are cherished and enshrined in Law.

South, North Korean ships collide in east sea – KCNA A South Korean ship collided with and damaged a North Korean vessel in early October, according to report from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) published today.The article from DRPK state media and gives the name of the ships involved, the coordinates and claims the collision was not accidental. Historical tracking data shows the vessel did indeed pass near – though not exactly through – the coordinates given by the KCNA report. The 190-meter ship then continued on its journey. It is currently near Taiwan’s Kaohsiung city.

Monday 5 October 2015

The week ahead in North Korea

The ROK-US Summit: What our two Presidents should talk about

KEI and the Hanmi Club will be meeting for a discussion with a distinguished group of visiting Korean journalists and political commentators on what Presidents Park Geun-hye and Barack Obama should talk about during the October 16 Summit.
The event will take place at the KEI Conference Facility, Washington DC, between 2 and 4 pm on October 5.
The discussion will feature contributions from Donald Manzullo, David Pong, Ahn Ho-young, Mi-sook Lee, Chan-soon Nam, Kang-duk Lee, William Brown and Mark Tokola.
Seating is limited, RSVPs required.
For more information and to RSVP click here.

Growth and Geography of Markets in North Korea: New Evidence from Satellite Imagery

As part of USKI’s Emerging Voices Paper Series, a research mentorship program for young scholars studying the North Korean economy, Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein will present his research on the growth and geography of markets in North Korea, based on examination of satellite imagery.
The presentation will take place at the Bernstein-Offit Building, Washington DC, from 12:30 to 2pm on October 5.
RSVPs are required.
For more information and to RSVP click here.

China and North Korea: Strategic and Policy Perspectives from a Changing China 

China and North Korea: Strategic Policy Perspectives from a Changing China is a book of essays by some of today’s leading Chinese experts on China’s foreign policy toward North Korea, the history of Beijing’s relations with Pyongyang, and North Korea’s politics and economy.
The launch will be taking place at the Kenney Auditorium, Washington DC, from 12 to 2 pm on October 6. Participants include Carla Freeman, Shi Yinhong, Cheng Xiaohe, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Bonnie Glaser.
Lunch will be provided and an RSVP is required.
For more information and to RSVP click here.

Assessing the North Korea Threat and U.S. Policy: Strategic Patience or Effective Deterrence? 

The Senate Subcommittee on East Asia, The Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy will meet on October 7th from 2:30 pm.
Witnesses are Jay Lefkowitz, Dr. Victor Cha and Ambassador Robert Gallucci.

Korea’s Growing Role in Asia: Regional Cooperation and National Unification

Wilson Center Global Fellow Dr. Park Jin will speak on Korea's growing role in Asia and what it means for regional cooperation and national reunification.
The talk is scheduled for 4 - 5 pm on October 7th.
For more information and to RSVP, click here.

Doing Business in North Korea

Jang Jin Sung will be speaking at the Edinburgh Centre for Carbon Innovation for a talk on the challenges, opportunities and ethical issues surrounding investing in North Korea.
The talk has been organised by the Asia Scotland Institute and the European Alliance for Human Rights in North Korea (EAHRNK), and will take place from 6 - 8 pm on October 8th.
For more information and to register, click here.

Daily Life in North Korea: A Video Presentation

Pastor Seung Eun Kim will present video clippings recorded from various settings, especially jangmadangs (open markets), taken in locations far away from Pyongyang.
The event will feature a light meal, and will take place from 6:30 to 8 pm on October 8th at the SAIS Rome Auditorium.
Reservations are required.
For more information and to RSVP, click here.

The Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency and Korean War POW/MIAs

This will be an opportunity to be updated on the operation of the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency and the Agency's perspective on Korean War POW/MIA issues.
Speakers include David Davis, Michael Linnington, Congressman Charles Rangel, Congressman Richard Nugent, Richard Downes and Donna Knox.
The event will take place at the Rayburn House Office Building between 1:30 and 3:30 pm on October 8th.
Please RSVP to dwertz@ncnk.org.

South Koreans' Perception of North Korea Issues

Professor Myoung-kyu Park will examine South Koreans' perception of North Korea-related issues: denuclearization, human rights, security, cooperation, and unification. Based on data from annual surveys conducted by IPUS during 2007-2015, Professor Park will discuss South Korean psychological attitudes, the generational gap, and general trends and policy orientation regarding North Korea.
The talk is scheduled for October 9th,12:00 - 1:15 pm.
RSVPs are requred by 5pm on October 7th.
For more information please contact hjahn@stanford.edu. To RSVP, click here.

Anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea

October 10th is the 70th anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea.
Party anniversaries are generally celebrated with parades and fireworks, though there has been speculation that the DPRK leadership will use this occasion to launch another rocket.

Sunday 4 October 2015

Pointing the world’s largest bomb at North Korea

The U.S. made bunker busting Massive Ordnance Penetrator developed with N. Korean, Iranian targets in mind

September 27th, 2015

John Grisafi and Leo Byrne

In 1991, during the first Gulf War, the U.S. military recognized a need for weapons that could pierce underground concrete bunkers and hardened facilities.

In three weeks military researchers fashioned a hardened steel bomb made from an artillery casing that could be dropped from a high altitude, pierce earth and concrete, and detonate inside underground bunkers.

The ability to crack open facilities that previously were resistant to conventional ordnance meant bunker designers had to dig deeper, wrapping important facilities in extra layers of concrete and burying them under mountains.

Few countries are better at protecting their facilities under layers of rock and concrete than Iran and North Korea, who began bunker-building programs so deep underground that even more advanced bombs would not damage them.

THE MOP

In 2008 Boeing and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) began work on a non-nuclear bunker-busting weapon that could reach even the most hardened facilities. After six years, several rounds of upgrades and $341 million in developing and purchasing costs, they came up with Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), the world’s largest conventional bomb.

At 15 tons and 20 feet long, the MOP is six times larger than the GBU-28 and GBU-37, which were previously the largest bunker busters in the U.S. inventory.

‘… one Pentagon official told Politico Magazine the MOP “boggles the mind”‘

The GPS guided bomb is dropped from 20,000 feet and approaches hypersonic speeds. It can burrow through 200 feet of earth and 60 feet of concrete before delayed smart fuses sense empty space and detonate.

No footage of the bomb’s tests have been released to the public, but one Pentagon official told PoliticoMagazine the MOP “boggles the mind.”

The weapon is so large that the USAF also had to alter their massive B2 stealth bombers to carry it. The B2 Spirit is the only aircraft that can carry the weapon, according to a report signed by J. Michael Gilmore, the Defense Department’s director of operational test and evaluation and obtained by specialist news site InsideDefense.com

The MOP’s development has been closely tracked by Inside Defense, who also acquired test documents from 2014 showing the MOP was upgraded and ready for use. The U.S. Air Force (USAF), however, commissioned further enhancements, and development continued as negotiations began with Iran to rein in its nuclear program.

Despite ongoing talks, Iran’s Furdow nuclear facility was high on the list of possible targets for the new ordnance. The nuclear fuel enrichment plant is built inside a mountain, and could require multiple hits even from weapons as large as the MOP.

NORTH KOREA DIGS DEEP

Iran was by no means the only target in mind during the MOP’s development, however. North Korea has a long history of concealing its facilities away from prying eyes.

“(The MOP) would enable a larger target set, particularly of hardened targets that are very difficult to destroy with existing ordnance … It gives you more options to be able to take out sites, particularly when countries like Iran and North Korea are hardening their targets to try and make it difficult for the U.S. to hit them,” Kenneth Katzman, a specialist in Middle Eastern affairs at the Congressional Research Service, told Inside the Air Force, in January this year.

Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta made similar remarks to the Wall Street Journal, earlier in the bomb’s development.

“It’s not just aimed at Iran. Frankly, it’s aimed at any enemy that decides to locate in some kind of impenetrable location. The goal here is to be able to get at any enemy, anywhere,” he said in 2012.

The U.S. military has for decades relied heavily upon air assets – including those of the U.S. Air Force as well as the other branches of the U.S. military – to conduct heavy bombardment of enemy territory and units.

Strategic bombers, which belong to the USAF, are used to fly at higher altitudes and conduct bombing runs targeting key military facilities and other strategic assets including infrastructure in enemy territory, especially during the early phases of a conflict.

The MOP being loaded onto a truck. Image credit: Wikimedia Commons

During the Korean War, the DPRK was subject to heavy aerial bombardment by the U.S. military.

Much of the country was leveled by bombing and it was difficult for the North Korean and Chinese forces to maintain heavy equipment or operate major bases in the country, unless they were heavily protected or difficult for United Nations forces to locate. Both of these factors could sometimes be achieved due in large part to taking advantage of Korea’s mountainous terrain.

The North Korean military has learned from its own experiences in the Korean War as well as observation of other conflicts since.

First-hand reports by troops and advisors sent to assist an ally, such as in the Vietnam War, will have helped the DPRK understand the effects of aerial bombardment as well methods of mitigating them, particularly use of underground bunkers, tunnels and camouflage.

North Korea has made extensive use of tunnels and bunkers for the military and to hide and protect other sensitive facilities, likely including bunkers and underground complexes to which the leadership could flee during a crisis.

In 2003, the LA Times spoke to defectors who worked on underground facilities before escaping North Korea. Their accounts revealed construction projects so secretive the workers were never allowed to leave, and remained there their whole lives.

“This is how we hide from our enemies. Everything in North Korea is underground,” a defector identified as “K” told the LA Times.

OPTIONS

U.S. military planners looking to deploy the MOP in North Korea would certainly have no shortage of options to choose from. Even a cursory glance of North Korea researcher Curtis Melvin’s 2007 Google Earth “DPRK uncovered” overlay shows large numbers of underground facilities scattered all across the country.

Though estimates vary, analysts and North Korea watchers place the number at greater than 10,000.

One the DPRK's 'thunderbird runways'. Image credit: Google Earth

One of the DPRK’s “thunderbird runways.” Image credit: Google Earth

“North Korea has many of its key military facilities underground. They may have a highly enriched uranium centrifuge facility underground – though this has not been verified … They also have aircraft facilities that are tucked inside of mountains for protection. Finally, some of their important command and control facilities are buried deep underground,” Bruce Bechtol, associate professor of political science at Angelo State University and president of the International Council on Korean Studies told NK News.

‘These (smaller) bunker busters can be really useful in neutralizing North Korea’s air superiority’

Nonetheless smaller, cheaper bunker busters might be sufficient to deploy against many of the more lightly protected facilities, in addition to artillery emplacements along the DMZ set into mountainsides.

“These (smaller) bunker busters can be really useful in neutralizing North Korea’s air superiority. To prevent their oil tanks being targeted by ROK-U.S. forces, North Korea hid its air fuel tanks under the ground. If we can identify their location, the GBU-28 can be used to penetrate those underground tankers,” Chung, a former ROK army officer who wished to remain anonymous told NK News.

“The ROK military’s No. 1 priority during wartime would be nullifying North Korea’s Long Range-Artilleries (LRA) hidden inside the mountains. Usually, ROK Air Forces are expected to demolish the facilities within 3-4 minutes prior to the first launch … we can (also) use GBU-28 to smash the entrances,” he added.

So far, given their high cost and deployment requirements the U.S. has only ordered 20 MOPs, so it seems likely they would only deploy them against high value, highly shielded targets.

While it is not publicly known if North Korea has any Furdow equivalent facilities, large structures, factories and roads built into mountainsides are in plentiful supply.

“I am unaware of any underground nuclear facilities in the DPRK – some sites have been targeted and inspected in the past with no results. Any such facility could be disguised as a mine or regular military base, of which there are thousands,” Melvin told NK News.

Despite the difficulties, some targets still appear relatively obvious. According to Melvin, the mountain behind the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces in Pyongyang could be a potential target, and a likely command and control center. Satellite imagery of the facility shows numerous entrances into the mountain.

Image credit: Google Earth

North Korea’s infamous “thunderbird runways,” aircraft strips which can be seen protruding through mountains in Wonsan and Onchon, are other possible targets.

“Also, there is an entire underground component under the Korean Worker’s Party complex 1 and 2 in downtown Pyongyang,” Melvin added.

These types of key facilities, along with air defenses and radars, are typically among the first targets for bombardment in the early stages of war, when a military force will seek to destroy an enemy’s command, control and communications network.

According to an article in Stars and Stripes on August 5, the U.S. military has mapped many of North Korea’s underground faculties. One of the reasons for such mapping is surely planning for aerial bombardment in the event of a conflict.

NORTH KOREAN ATTENTION

North Korea for their part, are not oblivious to the threat posed from new U.S. weaponry and the MOP, having released numerous articles on both U.S. and South Korean bunker busters in North Korean media.

The KCNA Watch data tool shows the North Korea’s primary media outlet began to mention the term “bunker buster” more frequently since the early half of 2010.

“The U.S. seeks to bomb the military and strategic targets of the DPRK all of a sudden by use of B-2 loaded with Bunker Buster in ‘contingency’ on the Korean Peninsula in a bid to disable them,” an article from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) published in September 2011 reads, a date coinciding with when the USAF first took delivery of the weapons, prior to rounds of upgrades to make them more accurate and resistant to jamming and interference technologies.

While a Pentagon official told Politico that a credible threat to its nuclear programs will have helped bring Iran to the negotiating table, North Korea are probably just as likely to keep digging deeper.

Additional reporting: JH Ahn

Featured image: Wikimedia Commons

Kim Jong Un’s popularity, explained

Despite purges, third generation of Kim rule maintains approval

September 27th, 2015

Andrei Lankov

A survey of North Korean refugees attracted some attention several weeks ago. According to the survey, a full 63 percent of recently arrived refugees believed that Kim Jong Un enjoys support amongst a majority of the North Korean public.

Such findings are not all that surprising for people who interact with North Koreans frequently enough. Indeed, while the protruding belly, plump cheeks and rather bizarre haircut present a somewhat comical picture to Western audiences, a significant number of North Koreans feel much hope about the third incarnation of Kimhood, finding the young leader attractive and somewhat charismatic.

It is often stated that one of the reasons behind Kim Jong Un’s popularity is his looks or, rather, his striking similarity to his grandfather, the late Generalissimo Kim Il Sung, who founded the North Korean state back in the 1940s. Indeed, the young Kim looks quite like his grandfather, and the North Korean propaganda apparatus goes out of its way to emphasize this.

Kim Il Sung was in power from 1945 to 1994 – nearly five decades. His rule was remarkably brutal: the emphasis on a hyper-Stalinism at home and often adventurous, aggressive foreign policies brought terrible tidings for his people. Nonetheless, the late dictator was and still remains popular.

To an extent, this reflects his genuine nationalistic credentials. The exploits of Kim Il Sung and his guerrillas in the 1930s were much exaggerated by later official propaganda. However, it is undeniable that the founder of the Kim dynasty once was a brave resistance fighter. The actual contribution he made toward the collapse of the Japanese Empire was pretty close to zero, but his heroic and seemingly doomed struggle in the wilderness of Manchuria made him widely known and respected amongst nationalist Koreans even before the liberation.

It did help Kim Il Sung’s standing in history that the famine that swept North Korea in the 1990s erupted after he died

It helps that Kim Il Sung was remarkably enthusiastic about promoting his own personality cult, which by the late 1960s reached a truly unprecedented level, leaving the notorious heights of Stalin and Mao in the long grass. Pretty much all North Koreans currently alive grew up on a heavy diet of stories about Kim Il Sung’s unparalleled wisdom, heroism and virtue. Expressing any doubt about such things was the quickest way to a rather painful death, so skeptics knew to remain silent.

It did help Kim Il Sung’s standing in history that the famine that swept North Korea in the 1990s erupted after he died. The famine brought suffering and deprivation to the vast majority of North Koreans, and around 500,000 died.

THE ‘LIBERAL’ KIM

The great famine of 1994-98 was to a large extent the inviolable result of the policies that Kim Il Sung had pursued for decades. The famine was brought about by Kim Il Sung’s fanatical belief in a hyper-centralized, state-managed agriculture, as well as an excessive reliance on (unacknowledged) foreign aid, not to mention militarization run amok. However, if the mine was planted (unintentionally, of course) by Kim Il Sung, it went off under the rule of his son. Hence, most North Koreans blame Kim Jong Il, rather than his father, for the economic disasters of the 1990s.

For the average North Korea over the last two decades, the times of Kim Il Sung have often been seen as a lost era of order and stability, in which everyone could be sure that twice a month they would receive food rations sufficient for survival, and essentially free of charge. This was also a time when corruption was kept under control and was largely invisible, material inequality was also almost unnoticeable.

Objectively speaking, it was Kim Il Sung’s policies that made the disaster of the 1990s unavoidable. But this had little impact on public perception, and he continues to be held in high esteem by many. Remarkably, such sentiments toward the late Generalissimo are even expressed by refugees – not usually known for their sympathies for the North Korean system and its embodiment, the Kim family.

Thus, it is that Kim Il Sung remains venerated, and due to the luck of dying in time, has a remarkably good reputation in death. The opposite is very much the case with his unfortunate son, Kim Jong Il, who inherited power in 1994 and reigned for 17 turbulent years, till 2011.

Of the Kim kings, Kim Jong Il was probably the softest and most liberal in many regards. His reign was marked by unnoticed and unappreciated relaxations of social controls. For example, it was Kim Jong Il who significantly decreased the number of political prisoners as a percentage of the population. Under Kim Jong Il’s watch, the political prisoners’ number declined from nearly 200,000 when his father died to a still massive but much smaller 80-90,000.

The (officially) revered Kim Jong Il photo by MichaelTyler

He also chose to turn a blind eye to cross-border traffic, thus allowing a burgeoning trade with China to grow more rapidly. He did not implement agricultural reforms, which he probably saw as destabilizing, but for much of his rule he looked upon the emerging market economy as a necessary evil that could be tolerated for the time being. He also chose not to punish excessively refugees found in China. Attempted escape to China became a misdemeanor, when it was once a serious crime.

However, for all this liberalization, Kim Jong Il did not become popular with his people. Kim Jong Il was seen as the source of all the mess. Under his watch, the stability and security of Kim Il Sung’s era suddenly disappeared, as people began to starve to death in large numbers. Hence, for the average man and woman from the North Korean street, he was the person who directly or indirectly was responsible for disaster and dislocation.

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

No one really knows what Kim Jong Un thinks about his father, with whom he probably spent relatively little time. However, it seems that the current North Korean sovereign finds it politically useful and astute to quietly distance himself from his paternal predecessor, who still remains officially venerated. When Kim Il Sung died, Kim Jong Il maintained a three-year mourning period that only ended in 1997, whereupon he officially took over supreme power in the state. Kim Jong Un, by contrast, only waited a few months before he anointed himself as the ruler of the country. Obviously, this was done to send a signal to his subjects, to make it clear that from now on, everything would be done differently, so perhaps the golden age of Kim Il Sung would return.

In reality, however, Kim Jong Un is quite different from his grandfather when it comes to policy. He is bandwagoning quite effectively on the grandfather Kim, but the first few years of Kim Jong Un’s rule have been marked by an exponential growth in the unofficial economy. The authorities have stopped interfering with many illegal and semi-legal private businesses that now flourish in North Korea. This change of direction, combined with earnings from mineral exports to China and beyond, not to mention the active sale of North Korean labour power overseas, has resulted in a noticeable economic recovery. In actual fact, this recovery began under Kim Jong Il’s stewardship, but for the average person, it is closely associated with his son, and hence is seen as a sign of his leadership talents.

‘People around my age love (Kim Jong Un). Girls kind of like him because he is handsome’

But what of state-sponsored terror, the much rumoured, alleged executions conducted under Kim Jong Un with remarkable frequency? Surprising though it may be, the average North Korean is not that worried about such things: under Kim Jong Un, purges nearly always target the elite, largely the military top brass and high level apparatchiks. The average person in North Korea does not feel all that sorry about the fate of these people, and sometimes even feels some relief when learning about the violent demise of yet another party secretary and four-star general. On the other hand, the chances of getting arrested for a real or alleged political crime has not changed much compared to what it was 5-10 years ago.

Popular attitudes to Kim Jong Un are nicely summed up by a young female refugee who recently said in an interview, “People around my age love him. Girls kind of like him because he is handsome. And seems to trying to do something. Certainly … But it is clear that he is trying to remain in power, so if necessary, he sometimes kills. But, I am not dead, right? So, I don’t care.”

How long with Kim Jong Un’s honeymoon last? Well, we cannot be sure. World history provides us with countless cases of political leaders loved first, before becoming the object of popular contempt and/or derision. Nonetheless, for the time being, one should admit: Right now, the Supreme Leader is popular with his people.

Picture: KCNA

What will it take for a normalization of relations between the U.S. and North Korea?
By Chad O'Carroll

First it was Myanmar, then Cuba – then finally a breakthrough nuclear deal with Iran. But what about North Korea? Veering towards another satellite launch this September and with strong potential of a follow-up nuclear test – as was the pattern in 2009 and 2013 – it appears almost impossible to imagine how a normalization of relations could occur anytime soon between the U.S. and North Korea.

Yet could there be a way? In part one of a major new NK News expert interview series, four American North Korea watchers – alongside a rising young voice – shared their thoughts about what it might take to see a major improvement in relations with North Korea.

And while there were some disagreements about exactly how things have got to the point they are now, there was striking accord amongst all participants on the impression that unlike with Cuba, Myanmar and Iran, North Korea is simply not interested in improving relations with its long-time foe.

Click here to read the full article at NK News

Korea killer: Is risk of failure stymieing U.S. North Korea policy?

By Chad O'Carroll

While ignoring North Korea runs the risk of Pyongyang conducting further satellite launches and nuclear tests – events that clearly go against long-term U.S. interests in the region – could it be that those risks are easier to deal with than the embarrassment of a major policy initiative failure?

In part two of a major new NK News expert interview series, four prominent American North Korea watchers – alongside a rising new voice – shared their thoughts about the current policy situation regarding Korea. On the one hand, some indicated the past record and risk of failure may have a major impact in restricting new options for policymakers.

On the other, one former State Department observer disputed the notion that President Obama wasn’t already making major efforts to deal with the problem. And yet others suggested there was little to be gained from further efforts.

Click here for the full article at NK News

Pivot to Asia: What does it mean for North Korea?
By Chad O'Carroll

Initially emerging in 2009, the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” strategy was said to reflect growing consensus that a significant part of history in the 21st century would be “written in the Asia-Pacific region.”

But today, almost seven years on, the policy appears to have had little impact on how Pyongyang looks at the outside world. And with inter-Korean tensions nearly bubbling over into conflict on two occasions since 2013, U.S. deterrence over the North has been described in some quarters as being shakier than ever.

In part three of a major new NK News expert interview series, established and rising American North Korea watchers look back at how exactly the pivot to Asia is impacting the Korean peninsula. While some suggested Pyongyang may be increasing emboldened by decreasing U.S. military capabilities – with the impact that some nations may be unsure of relying too much on American assurances – others stated the policy didn’t effect the Koreas too much.

Click here for the full article at NK News

Analysis: International service unlikely to N. Korea’s new Wonsan Int’l Airport
By Chad O'Carroll

International service to a recently showcased modern new airport at the east coast city of Wonsan is not yet possible, and major hurdles could prevent the introduction of service there any time soon, an NK News analysis of the airport and domestic airline capabilities has shown.

North Korea’s state airline Air Koryo currently only has four aircraft permitted to enter neighboring Chinese and Russian airspace, while the new Wonsan International Airport is said to currently lack refueling capabilities to top up visiting commercial jets.

The lack of commercial refueling capabilities means that for the foreseeable future, only domestic flights from nearby domestic airports will be possible, provided they bring enough fuel to make a round-trip without refueling in Wonsan.

Click here for the full article at NK News

The many ways of dying in North Korea
By Fyodor Tertitskiy

Sad news often comes from North Korea and this news often involves someone being executed. Usually it is either a nameless group of people killed for something small – like possessing foreign DVDs – or some high-ranking official.

However, apart from that the average person does not know much about the death penalty in North Korea. When can a person be executed? Who passes the sentence? Who administers the punishment?

Legal proceedings in North Korea take more than one avenue. One exists for common criminals, another for political offenders. Moreover, the military, as well as the concentration camps, have their own internal courts and regulations. The procedures regulating common criminals are quite standard: The accused stands trial and judges pass a verdict according to the DPRK’s penal code. In the Kim Il Sung era the penal code itself was de facto a restricted document. Even diplomats in foreign embassies who did their best to get their hands on the document failed to do so.

Click here for the full article at NK News