Wednesday, 9 December 2015

NK: Intelligence from NK News: Unreported exercise conducted in October combined submarines, hovercraft and modern VSV-type craft

North Korean naval exercise simulates amphibious assault, naval battles
North Korean naval exercise simulates amphibious assault, naval battles
Unreported exercise conducted in October combined submarines, hovercraft and modern VSV-type craft
December 7th, 2015


North Korean military conducted naval drills near the city of Nampo, imagery from Google Earth has revealed. The exercise, which took place on October 5, featured more than 80 watercraft and included a range of different Korean People’s Army Navy (KPAN) elements including fast attack craft, submarines and air-cushioned landing craft. Although the exact specifics of the drill such as objectives and compositions of different groups are hard to determine with the limited footage available (especially given the fact that it is unknown what phase the exercise was in at the time the photo was made), the naval craft present and their locations seem to indicate the aim was to pit two parties against each other in a hovercraft invasion of a coastal city.* Alternatively, it is possible the entire force cooperated in a mission against an entirely simulated foe, which has been the case in televised North Korean naval drills of the past.
North Korea’s vast military hovercraft force, in fact the largest in the world, is roughly divided amongst five global bases (two on the East coast and three on the West coast), the latest of which was constructed in early 2011 at a distance of just some 30 kilometers from South Korea’s Baengyeong Island. Air-cushioned landing craft are sure to play an important part in the North’s attack plans should war erupt on the Korean Peninsula, and at least 20 were thought to have been deployed to the newly built bases during the escalation of tensions in August this year. Of the two major indigenously developed types currently in use with the Korean People’s Army (KPA), 10 of each contributed to the exercise, with the smaller single-propeller “Kong Bang III” hovercraft leading the invasion ahead of the twin-propeller Kong Bang IIs, which measure around 20 meters in length. At the time the satellite image was taken this force was at a distance of roughly six kilometers from the main harbor area of Nampo and the ships and submarines assembled in front of it, where an additional Kong Bang III hovercraft was also moored, possibly as a reserve.
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So Bang II and So Bang III-class air-cushion landing craft.
Curiously, a large formation of small watercraft believed to be jet skis can also be observed heading toward the rest of the participating craft. Whether these unorthodox vessels, arranged in three rough groups of 10, 10 and 12, are meant to approach larger naval ships and disable them is unclear, although this would definitely be an interesting asymmetric method of warfare for the North to explore. Alternatively, the jet skis could be employed to quickly infiltrate South Korean shorelines with North Korean Special Forces, although operational range and the craft’s limitations would impede its effective use in this role, possibly necessitating the use of a “mothership” which can carry the jet skis internally to the battle area.
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Jet skis in formation
Among the forces assembled in front of the harbor itself were five submarines belonging to two different classes. The largest, of which just one of the four present on the West coast participated, was a Type 033 Romeo-class diesel-electric submarine which measures 77 meters in length, a copied vessel delivered by China but originally developed by the Soviet Union in the late 1950s. The other four submarines are all of the DPRK’s indigenously developed Sang-O I-class, a 34-meter-long craft that is slowly being supplanted by its lengthier successor, the Sang-O II. The role of these submarines in the exercise is uncertain, as they are mostly of use against larger naval craft such as the ROKS Cheonan which is believed to have been sunk by a torpedo fired by a Sang-O-class submarine on the March 26, 2010, killing 46 seamen. However, multiple variants exist including a confirmed infiltration type, one of which was captured in 1996. No naval craft above 43 meters in length (aside from the Type 033 Romeoclass submarine) appeared to take part in the drill, so it might be possible that, as was witnessed during reported exercises in the pastwhere islands were repeatedly torpedoed, the submarines’ targets may have been simulated entirely.
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Romeo-class and Sang-O-class submarines (click image for full view)
Smaller supporting naval vessels, usually measuring around 25 meters, were also present in a large variety of types. Nine of these craft carried torpedoes, comprising four of the older Kusong/P4-class torpedo boats (the latter referring to their original designation and the former to that of the North Korean copy) equipped with two 450mm torpedoes, and five Sinhung-class torpedo boats outfitted with two 533mm torpedoes. More signifying of North Korea’s relatively unorthodox naval strategies are five Chaho-class craft equipped with 122mm multiple rocket launchers and another five Chongjin-class craft armed with 85mm or 100mm gun turrets, possibly of the same type as was mounted on a patrol boat that scored an immediate hit at the start of the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong on June 29, 2002. Finally, five Nampo class gunboats equipped with either two twin-barreled 14.5mm turrets or their modern 14.5mm rotary cannon replacements provided light firepower, and, considering their capabilities as landing craft, may have reinforced the attacking force.
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Supporting vessels of various classes (click image for full view)
Five larger fast attack craft (FAC) in the form of three Soviet-legacy Osa I-class ships and two of their lengthened North Korean copies designated Soju-class by the U.S. Department of Defense formed the heart of what was presumably the defending force, carrying four anti-ship missiles derived from the 1960s P-15 Termit each, as well as two AK-230 twin-barreled 30mm close-in weapon systems (CIWS) guided by a Drum Tilt radar. Although antique by modern standards, large numbers of these FACs combined with their older Komar-class predecessor also still in use with the KPAN might temporarily overwhelm South Korean defenses and score some hits, especially if they are equipped with advanced variants of the P-15 Termit.
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Possible defending forces in exercise (click image for full view)
The sole larger ships taking part in the drill were a single Chodo-class gunboat at 43 meters length, and a 34 meters long very slender vessel (VSV), which quite likely was the most modern component of the exercise. The first of these two combines the 85/100mm gun turret also seen on the Chongjin-class with two 37mm turrets on the rear and a ZPU-4 anti-aircraft mount, although it is not unlikely its armament has been slightly upgraded since it was last seen in video footage. The second craft is one that has seen the light of day only since 2014, and uses a very peculiar design to reach very high speeds and a large degree of stealthiness. This type of vessel is based around a very long and thin cylindrical hull to allow it to pierce waves rather than go over them, which makes for a much smoother ride, due to which higher speeds can be reached without stressing materials, equipment and personnel overly much. Although this design certainly isn’t unprecedented, North Korea is the first to produce it in a strictly military role, equipping ships in this class with a range of different weaponry, the specific types of which are unfortunately hard to identify on the example featured in this exercise. Nonetheless, development of this new class of warships is advancing at a swift pace and it is not implausible they will at one point present the South Korean navy with an unexpected challenge, be it during all-out war or smaller scale confrontations such as the ones of the previous two decades.
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VSV and Chodo-class gunboat with tug nearby
Ultimately, possibly the most notable aspect of the drill wasn’t in the participating naval craft, the simulated objectives or the location where it took place, but in the fact that it was not televised or even reported. Where most known exercises are widely publicized and described by North Korean state media in an attempt to instill an image of combat readiness and ongoing modernization into foreign navies and, more importantly, the international public, it would appear the goal this time was solely to improve the skills of crew involved and test out novel tactics and weapons designs. The timing of this event is also no coincidence: At less than one and a half month from August’s volatile confrontation with the South its significance is obvious. In the end, it portrays a much more convincing image of a nation still trying to keep its navy up to date with that of its nemesis than any amount of state propaganda could, and shows the DPRK might have been more serious about the possibility of war than some have speculated.
Note: Nampho, where the exercise took place, actually lies a few kilometers upstream of the Taedong river.
Featured image: Drill of KPA Large Combined Units 572 and 630, November 2014, Korean Central News Agency
All images within text: Google Earth

Rumors of bombing attempt on Kim Jong Un spread in N.Korea

Rumors of bombing attempt on Kim Jong Un spread in N.Korea
Rumors of bombing attempt on Kim Jong Un spread in N.Korea
S.Korean explosives expert casts doubt, saying episode a rumor or a setup to win leader's favor
December 4th, 2015
However, a former demolitions instructor from the South Korean Special Forces told NK News that there is strong chance that the news is “just another North Korea rumor.”
An anonymous source told RFA that a hidden stack of explosives was found inside the Kalma Airport on October 6.
“Kim Jong Un’s visit to Kalma airport was cancelled immediately, as explosives were found a day before his visit.”
Kalma Airport, also known as Wonsan International Airport, has been the site of a major construction and renovation project over the past two years, NK News director of intelligence John Grisafi has written.
The airport was completed and revealed to the public in late September.
The source further claimed that North Korea’s State Security Department (SSD) found out about the hidden explosives, which Kim Jong Un’s Supreme Guard Command had failed to find during a previous search for threats.
“The explosives were planted inside the roof of the airport’s information desk,” the source told RFA.
“The explosive found at the desk was a box of TNT which North Koreans use to blast through mines. A box can hold about 100 explosives and each (explosive) would weigh around 200g.”
Jeong Jin-man, formerly of the South Korean Special Forces cast doubt on the rumor, at least as it was told to the RFA. For one thing, TNT is not used in the way the RFA’s article described, he said.
“First, TNT is unsuitable for blasting through mines or tunnels, unlike how the source explained,” said Jeong.
“The detonation velocity of explosives used to blast an underground tunnel is around 5,700-6,900 m/sec, and the velocity of those for blasting mines are around 4,500 m/sec, while those for open pit blasting have velocity of 3,300-5,900 m/sec.
“So the explosives used for industrial purposes have a limited detonation velocity of 3,000 to 6,900 m/sec, while TNT has a detonation velocity of 7,000 m/sec.”
Jeong explained that TNT is unnecessarily powerful for industrial use, and can emit toxic gas if detonated inside an enclosed area.
“So no one would use TNT to blast open a tunnel,” he said.
Jeong explained that, assuming that TNT was actually found by North Korean authorities, then there is a possibility that the whole incident was set up by one of the North Korean bureaus to win Kim Jong Un’s favor.
“As the RFA’s article explained, if North Korea’s SSD had found out the explosives which Kim Jong Un’s Supreme Guard Command had failed to locate, than the Supreme Guard Command might have been involved in the assassination attempt.”
“But, also, it might have been an SSD setup to win Kim Jong Un’s favor by setting up the TNT and pretending that they found it after the Supreme Guard Command had already swept the site.”
Featured Image: nikles5 (Pixabay)

U.S.-Iran deal could lead to more Iranian oil in N. Korea

U.S.-Iran deal could lead to more Iranian oil in N. Korea
U.S.-Iran deal could lead to more Iranian oil in N. Korea
Easing Iranian oil sanctions could see more exports or re-exports from China: Congressional report
December 7th, 2015
The document covers the likely consequences to Iran’s foreign policy in the wake of 
“According to some observers, a portion of China’s purchases of oil from Iran and other suppliers is re-exported to North Korea,” the article reads.
“As Iran’s oil imports increase after international sanctions are removed in conjunction with the JCPOA, it is likely that additional quantities of Iranian oil might reach North Korea, either via China or through direct purchasing by North Korea.”
The Congressional report does not give further details on the re-exports, thought the NK News ship tracker does show frequent North Korean tanker trips to a number of oil terminals in China.
Despite a long running of absence of crude oil in China’s reported trade figures with the DPRK, all signs point to a relative abundance of oil in the country, which has seen a marked increase in the number of cars on its roads.
The new demand, coupled with the DPRK’s lack of domestic oil and gas production and refinery capacity, could make it a likely destination for Iranian crude or oil products. Nor would the shipments be without precedent, during the 1980s Iran paid for North Korean missile cooperation with oil supplies.
“North Korea is one of the few countries with which Iran has formal military-to-military relations, and the two countries have cooperated on a wide range of military and WMD-related ventures, particularly the development of ballistic missile technology,” the Congressional report adds.
Iran also borrowed a page from the DPRK’s playbook during the sanctions era, changing the names and flags of its oil tankers in an attempt to circumvent sanctions.
The Middle Eastern country has some of the world’s largest super tankers, though reflagged many of them to different countries, in an attempt to keep oil flowing out of the country.  According to an articlefrom the Financial Times in 2012, over the course of three months Iran changed the flags and names of over half its very large crude oil tankers.
Although the DPRK’s tankers are at the opposite end of the scale and can carry only small amounts of oil products, NK News investigations have found that North Korea uses similar tactics to move oil from Russian terminals to Nampho on the country’s west coast.
Using flags from other countries, North Korean oil tankers can sail very close to South Korea, a route not available to DPRK flagged ships due to the May 24 sanctions, which prevent North Korean vessels from using the South’s ports and waterways.
Featured Image: Oil Pump Jack by Paul Lowry on 2008-08-13 18:25:13

Syria, Iran among N. Korea’s “resilient” customers

Syria, Iran among N. Korea’s “resilient” customers – Berger
Syria, Iran among N. Korea’s “resilient” customers – Berger
New book highlights areas of ongoing cooperation despite sanctions regimes
December 8th, 2015
North Korea has continued trafficking arms and expertise to numerous countries after the 2006 impositions of sanctions, according to a new book by Andrea Berger at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) entitled “Target Markets: North Korea’s Military Customers in the Sanctions Era”.
The 160 page document highlights how the DPRK’s potential customers can be divided into three different categories, the most of “resilient” of which are unlikely to be dissuaded by sanctions regimes alone.
“Syria, Iran, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burma and Cuba have been steadfast, continuing to contract out to Pyongyang for arms and related materiel and services in spite of taboos and legal restrictions against doing so,” the book reads.
North Korea leverages long standing relationships with many of these countries to engage in sanctions breaking behaviour. In doing so it has likely transferred weapons systems, their designs, provided training and maintenance services and even personnel to its more resilient customers.
Syria is likely one of North Korea’s most long standing collaborators, with numerous recent interactions including help with Damascus’ chemical weapons programs, shipments of chemical protection suits, gas masks as well as missile and conventional weapon parts.
Military cooperation with Damascus could be ongoing since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. The report cites the director of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, who claims a small number of North Korean officers are currently providing support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces in the country.
It might be difficult for sanctions regimes alone to pry apart these long standing relationships, the book notes, as participants are fully aware of the measures in place to prevent trade in sanctioned items.
“Resilient customers by their nature are not as sensitive to the normative and legal pressures created by the sanctions regime. In most cases, concerns vis-a-vis resilient clients also extend far beyond the North Korea military issue,” Berger told NK News.
“As a result, it is highly unlikely that any outreach by governments or the UN on the North Korea matter alone will dissuade those actors from shopping in Pyongyang,” she continued, adding that fully cutting ties between the DPRK and a resilient client country would require wider ranging political or security changes.
The DPRK has also cultivated different markets and groups of buyers, shifting its primary business away from ballistic technology to smaller arms and other weapons systems as demand changed over time.
According to the paper, some countries or non-state groups would likely prefer to buy from other sources, given current sanctions regimes and political pressures, but found that previous military aid or purchases have made them reliant on the DPRK’s catalogue.
One last group also exists which includes countries like Eritrea and the Republic of Congo, whose limited budgets mean they need to extend the functionality of existing supplies as long as possible.
“These clients seem to have been largely motivated by the need to keep certain types of ageing weapons systems or production technology in service, and North Korean willingness to provide that assistance economically,” the report adds.
TECHONLOGICAL PROGRESS
While current sanctions against the DPRK might not dissuade their long standing customers, the report also notes that they do serve to cut North Korea off from cutting edge military technologies.
This could limit North Korea’s R&D departments, forcing them to upgrade existing systems or reverse engineer what can be sourced from abroad.  According to the paper, the constraints could cause the DPRK to fall ever further behind the curve, reducing their number of existing and potential customers over time.
“The trend is already visible in markets such as Ethiopia, which is phasing out the T-54/55 tanks that North Korea previously assisted with, in favour of newer but still second-hand T-72 tanks from countries such as Ukraine.” Berger added.
“Within the next decade or two many more doors will likely close for North Korea, as its prospective clients will find it enormously difficult, if not impossible, to keep mid-Cold War era weapons systems in service.”
The report concludes that without further access to new technologies, Pyongyang may find itself ever increasingly marginalised in the global defense market.
Featured Image: Bashar al-Assad propaganda by watchsmart on 2007-09-25 21:19:37

S. Korea sending priests for Easter Mass in Pyongyang


S. Korea sending priests for Easter Mass in Pyongyang
N. Koreans would welcome visit Pope Francis, South Korean archbishop tells press after visit
December 8th, 2015
The South Korean Catholic bishops who traveled to Pyongyang last week have announced that the South Korean Catholic Church will send priests to Changchung Cathedral in Pyongyang to hold Easter Mass with North Korean Catholics.
Their Pyongyang counterpart also told the South Korean archbishop that “North Korean Catholics are well aware of Pope Francis and the path he has walked,” and casually mentioned that a papal visit to Pyongyang would be “wonderful,” said the public relations office from the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Korea (CBCK).
“Unless the future inter-Korean relationship walks in unexpected paths, we should be able to send South Korean priests to Changchung Cathedral in Pyongyang to hold mass starting next Easter,” said Archbishop Kim Hee-jong of Gwangju, one those who visited Pyongyang.
The visiting committee, whose name roughly translates as the “Special Bishops’ Committee for Korean Reconciliation” consists of five bishops from Gwangju, Chuncheon, Daegu, Uijeongbu and Waegwan Abbey, in addition to 17 other priests and staff.
Kim has told the press that he and Yeom Soo-jung, the Archbishop of Seoul and Cardinal of Korea, had already agreed to send priests to North Korea even before the trip.
On his fourth day in Pyongyang, Kim led mass with around 70 North Korean Catholics at Changchung Cathedral and blessed the Catholic in attendance with the sacrament and communion, reads PBC’sreport.
Lee Young-sik, public relations officer at CBCK, told NK News that the framework for further interactions with North Korean Catholics is set, but the details are yet to be filled in.
“Archbishop Kim told his North Korean counterpart that despite 300 years of religious persecution in Japan, Catholics still lived their life of faith under the shadow,” said Lee.
“The archbishop expressed his belief that despite ongoing religious persecution, some or a few Catholics would be still living the life of faith secretly in North Korea.”
Lee added that talks on the pope’s visit to North Korea were only part of “casual asking and answering” between the South Korean archbishop and his Pyongyang counterpart part and should not be directly interpreted as firm statement.
Featured image: Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Korea (CBCK)

Kim Jong Un’s aunt, her husband sue defectors for defamation

Kim Jong Un’s aunt, her husband sue defectors for defamation
Kim Jong Un’s aunt, her husband sue defectors for defamation
Rumors prompting suit dealt with Kim Jong Nam ouster, use of ruling family funds for plastic surgery
December 2nd, 2015
South Korean lawyer Kang Yong-suk, on behalf of Ko Yong Suk and her husband Lee Kang, said that they have filed suit against three North Korean defectors for spreading false information about Ko and her family.
Ko Yong Suk is the younger sister of Ko Yong Hui, the mother to Kim Jong Un and third wife of late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.
In 1998, Ko and her husband chose to relocate from Switzerland to the U.S., according to a 2013JoongAng Ilbo report.
The report noted that an anonymous South Korean intelligence source, who claimed that he had worked during former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung’s administration, told the paper that both Ko and her husband had gone through cosmetic surgery to change their identities and were living under the Central Intelligence Agency’s protection.
“The reason behind Ko’s defection to U.S. is still mainly unknown,” said Cheong Sung-chang, researcher at the Sejong Institute in Seoul.
“To my knowledge, Lee Kang was working as a North Korean diplomat and got into some trouble that was seen as problematic in the North Korean leader’s eyes.”
Cheong has also noted that Lee used to be called Park Kun prior to his defection to the U.S.
Lee visited the attorney on Monday to file suit against the three South Korean individuals, including a former officer from North Korea’s State Security Department, a former North Korean diplomat and the son-in-law of the former North Korean prime minister.
Their attorney stated that these three appeared on South Korean television programs from 2013 to 2014 and made false claims, including about Ko’s involvement in the ouster of Kim Jong Nam, older brother to Kim Jong Un, and the rumor that Ko paid for plastic surgery with Kim Jong Il’s secret funds.
“There is no way that these defendants would have known about the recent situation in North Korea as they defected back in the 1990s,” their attorney told Yonhap.
“Lee Kang asked why these defendants would claim such false information as if it were true.”
Yonhap said Lee showed his American passport to prove his identity to the attorney and has left Korea already.
Their attorney declined to provide NK News with additional details on the ongoing case.
Featured Image: Ko Yong Hui and a younger Kim Jong Un, from the North Korean movie 위대한 선군 조선의 어머님